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HIRABAYASHI AND THE INVASION EVASION*
ERIC L. MULLER"
This Article presents archival evidence demonstrating that
government lawyers made a crucial misrepresentation to the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943), the case that upheld the constitutionality of a
racial curfew imposed on Japanese Americans in World War II.
While the government's submissions in Hirabayashi maintained
that the curfew was a constitutional response to the serious threat of
a Japanese invasion of the West Coast, new archival findings make
clear that military officials foresaw no Japanese invasion and were
planning for no such thing at the time they ordered mass action
against Japanese Americans. The archival record also demonstrates
that at the time that Justice Department lawyers filed their brief in
Hirabayashi emphasizing a threatened invasion, they knew that top
military officials had denied the risk of invasion in communications
to Congress. The Article seeks to understand how Justice
Department lawyers came to make such a misrepresentation and
demonstrates that the Hirabayashi decision deserves to be as fully
and resoundingly repudiated as the Court's better-known decision
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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INTRODUCTION
Few decisions of the United States Supreme Court stand as
thoroughly discredited as Korematsu v. United States,' the 1944 case
that upheld the constitutionality of the mass exclusion of Japanese
Americans from the West Coast in the spring of 1942. Korematsu
announced a principle of extremely demanding judicial review of
racial laws2 but applied that principle so loosely that later generations
have repudiated the Court's analysis. In 1995, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that Korematsu's approval of racial exclusion was an
"error," a "fail[ure] to detect an illegitimate racial classification. '
Hiding in the shadow of Korematsu is another Supreme Court
decision upholding racial wartime restrictions on Japanese
Americans: Hirabayashi v. United States.4 In that 1943 case, the Court
unanimously upheld the dusk-to-dawn curfew that the government
imposed on Japanese Americans a few weeks before launching the
mass exclusion program upheld in Korematsu. One might assume
that Hirabayashi has shared Korematsu's ignominious fate. To some
extent, this is true. In the 1980s, federal courts invalidated the
criminal convictions in both the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases by
issuing coram nobis writs on account of government misconduct in
the prosecution of the cases.6 While the Supreme Court has never
formally overruled the holding of either of the cases, both have been
vitiated on their facts. To the extent that the federal government's
apology and redress7 in the 1980s for the wartime repression of
Japanese Americans implicitly condemned the Supreme Court's
wartime endorsement of that repression, the condemnation would
seem to apply equally to both cases.
Yet Hirabayashi has somehow managed to avoid the full
repudiation that has been heaped on the later and better-known
exclusion case. Over the decades, members of the Court have cited
Hirabayashi without evident disdain.8 Just six years ago, in a
1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2. Id. at 216.
3. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).
4. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
5. Id. at 101.
6. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v.
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Yasui v. United States,
772 F.2d 1496, 1499-500 (9th Cir. 1985) (remanding case for determination of whether
coram nobis writ could be issued despite the fact that Yasui had not appealed his original
criminal conviction within the standard ten-day limit).
7. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989b to 1989-4(f) (2006).
8. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 214; Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611
(1987); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978); DeFunis v.
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dissenting opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,9  Justice Thomas
unapologetically cited Hirabayashi for the proposition that the
judiciary should defer to the executive's characterizations of the
factual predicates for wartime detentions, without drawing
disapproval from any of his fellow Justices. State courts and lower
federal courts have occasionally cited the case without disapproval as
well.10
The survival of Hirabayashi is troubling because, of the two
decisions, Hirabayashi is the more potent in today's world. The
military order that the Court upheld in Korematsu imposed a burden
of epic proportions: the wholesale eviction, on short notice, of tens of
thousands of American citizens from a huge swath of territory on the
mainland of the United States, on the basis of the simple fact of their
ancestry.11 One need not be too much of a Pollyanna to think that
such a draconian racial order is unlikely to be repeated. The order
upheld in Hirabayashi, by contrast, imposed a much less burdensome
restriction-the requirement that a citizen of Japanese ancestry
merely stay home after dark unless he had the government's
permission to go out. 2 The point is not that the curfew imposed no
hardships, for surely it did. 3 The point is instead that in our post-
September 11 world, it is far easier to imagine the government
imposing (and a frightened public demanding) a race- or religion-
based emergency security measure that is akin to a curfew than to
mass racial detention. Unlike Korematsu, the Hirabayashi case
arguably still "lies about like a loaded weapon,"14 one might say,
waiting to be brandished in defense of such a measure.
The survival of Hirabayashi is also troubling because it appears
less susceptible than Korematsu to impeachment in the court of
history. In the early 1980s, careful research in War Department and
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 n.12 (1963).
9. 542 U.S. 507, 584 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas again cited
Hirabayashi without evident disapproval in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 752 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. See EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 713 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 542
U.S. 426 (2004); Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 655 n.11 (9th Cir.
2002); In re Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993).
11. See COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 2-3 (1982) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED].
12. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1943).
13. See ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR 1120-22 (2001).
14. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Justice Department archives turned up proof of misrepresentation
and evidence suppression in the government's submissions to the
Supreme Court in Korematsu.5 The deceptions were all in the service
of exaggerating what might be termed the "internal" component of
the national security crisis the nation faced in 1942-the threat that
Japanese Americans would commit acts of domestic sabotage and
espionage within the United States. 6
In an important 2004 article, Professor Jerry Kang argued that
the deceptions in Korematsu, although egregious and unethical,
probably did not cause the Court to uphold the mass exclusion; the
Court's own racism did. 7 But however influential the government's
misconduct may or may not have been in Korematsu, that misconduct
probably did not influence the outcome of Hirabayashi, for a simple
reason of timing.18 The most important attorney misconduct in the
Korematsu case was the submission to the Court of a sanitized version
of a military report that misrepresented the true reasons for mass
exclusion. But when Justice Department lawyers submitted their
Hirabayashi brief in the spring of 1943, they did not yet have that
report in hand, and they did not rely on it in their brief. That report
only became available later, in time for the briefing of Korematsu.1 9
So the important archival research of the early 1980s that revealed
attorney misconduct and undermined the Court's Korematsu opinion
was not nearly as damning to Hirabayashi. That decision therefore
comes to us comparatively clear of the taint of attorney misconduct
that the archives yielded a quarter century ago.20
Now the archives continue their work of revelation. This Article
presents new evidence of a different misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court litigation-one that directly impugns Hirabayashi.
The misrepresentation concerns what might be termed the "external"
component of the national security threat in early 1942-the danger
that Japanese military forces posed to the West Coast of the United
States. In the words of the government's brief in Hirabayashi, "[t]he
15. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, at viii-ix (1983).
16. See Thomas Y. Fujita-Rony, Korematsu's Civil Rights Challenges: Plaintiffs'
Personal Understandings of Constitutionally Guaranteed Freedoms, the Defense of Civil
Liberties, and Historical Context, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 51,64 (2003).
17. See Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 933 passim (2004).
18. Professor Kang makes a version of this point in Denying Prejudice, attributing the
insight to Margaret Chon. See id. at 989.
19. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 202-06.
20. But cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1987)
(affirming district court's conclusion that the Hirabayashi Court's reasoning would have
been different had the Justice Department not suppressed certain evidence).
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principal danger to be apprehended was a Japanese invasion "21 which
"might have threatened the very integrity of our nation. ' 22 With the
Japanese "at the crest of their military fortunes," the brief
maintained, military officials found it "imperative" to "take adequate
protective measures against a possible invasion of the West Coast.'"
The nighttime curfew on Japanese Americans was one such measure.
This depiction of a Japanese invasionary threat found a
sympathetic audience in the Supreme Court in Hirabayashi. Chief
Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, accepted that the men
"charged with the responsibility of our national defense had ample
ground for concluding that they must face the danger of invasion,"'24 a
danger that concurring Justice Douglas insisted was "not fanciful but
real."25 Singling out Japanese Americans for curfew was reasonable,
according to the Chief Justice, because of their "ethnic affiliations
with an invading enemy. 26
Archival records now make clear that all this talk of a Japanese
invasion bore no relationship to the military situation in the eastern
Pacific in early 1942-not just the military situation we can see with
the benefit of hindsight, but the one that the military actually
perceived at that time.27 Top army and navy officials viewed a
Japanese invasion of California, Oregon, or Washington as
impracticable in early 1942.28 They were neither anticipating nor
preparing for any such assault.29 Indeed, during the key time period of
early 1942, the Army was more concerned with scaling back the
defense of the West Coast from land attack than with bolstering it.30
These assessments of the Japanese threat to the West Coast
were, of course, secret. But archival records clearly show that top
military officials shared them with members of Congress in early
February of 1942, not long before President Roosevelt signed the
executive order that authorized the curfew and exclusion of Japanese
21. Brief of Appellee at 65, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (No. 870)
[hereinafter Hirabayashi Brief] (emphasis added) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
22. Id. at 61.
23. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
24. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94.
25. Id. at 105 (Douglas, J., concurring); cf. infra note 128 (suggesting that Justice
Douglas may have been influenced by private conversations with a military official).
26. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101 (majority opinion).
27. See infra notes 138-210 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 138-210 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 138-210 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 178-95 and accompanying text.
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Americans.3 Records also reveal that Justice Department lawyers
may have learned of these assessments at the same time, and
definitely learned of them by the fall of 1942.32
This last piece of archival evidence is perhaps the most
disturbing: the Justice Department lawyers who prepared the
government's brief in Hirabayashi in 1943 knew that military officials
had foreseen no reasonable risk of a Japanese invasion of the West
Coast in early 1942, yet knowing this did not stop them from urging
the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that "[t]he principal
danger" preoccupying military officials in early 1942 "was a Japanese
invasion. ' 3  These lawyers, it must be emphasized, were not without
scruples. They were lawyers who, in other contexts in the Japanese
American wartime litigation, protested the military's distortions of
the supposed internal threat that Japanese Americans posed and
lobbied to purge the government's Korematsu brief of
misrepresentations on that issue. 34 Yet they distorted the supposed
external Japanese military threat.
How could these lawyers have presented such a significant
falsehood? That is the most difficult question that this Article asks,
but the question defies an easy answer. Perhaps the lawyers simply
quieted their doubts and their consciences by telling themselves that
their information was not concrete enough to lead them to do
anything but zealously advocate for their client. But a partial answer
may also lie in the power of what Jerry Kang has called "racial
schemas," the cognitive web of racial categories and meanings that
undergird our decisions and actions in matters touching on race.35
One of the central components of the "Yellow Peril" mythology that
captured American minds in the early twentieth century was the
image of "Orientals" as an invading horde, an indistinguishable mass
of people flooding over our western frontier.36 These Justice
Department lawyers proved themselves able to resist-even to
protest-certain aspects of this racial schema when military officials
sought to smear American citizens as an internal threat. But the
invasion component of this schema may have proved too powerful for
even them, leading them to repress what they knew about the
Japanese enemy in favor of what most everyone feared.
31. See infra notes 194-208 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
33. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 21, at 65.
34. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 278-302.
35. See Kang, supra note 17, at 956-58.
36. See infra notes 253-68 and accompanying text.
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This is just speculation. We cannot know for sure what led
Justice Department lawyers to argue so powerfully to the Supreme
Court that the military imposed a racial curfew to meet a Japanese
invasion, a threat the lawyers knew the military did not actually
foresee. If the speculation is correct, however, then it might lead us to
wonder about the impact of our society's mental schemas for "Islamic
terrorists" on even the best and most ethical military and Justice
Department lawyers who have been, and will be, called upon to
defend our counterterrorism policies in court. Even if the speculation
is not correct, and we are left unsure of what led otherwise well-
intentioned lawyers to distort the external threat to the nation's
security, we still know a good deal more from these archival
disclosures about the bankruptcy of the Supreme Court's Hirabayashi
decision than we knew before. And what we now know should lead us
to condemn that decision just as loudly and clearly as we do the more
notorious Korematsu case.
I. DEFENDING THE WEST COAST: FROM WAR PLAN ORANGE
THROUGH THE CURFEW
The specific timing, location, and method of Japan's attack at
Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to American military planners, but
the idea of war with Japan did not. While American policy makers in
the years after the conclusion of World War I thought the country
could avoid war with most of the country's potential rivals, that
confidence never fully extended to Japan.3 7 American military
planners nervously eyed the expansion of the Japanese military in the
1920s, Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and its growing military
conflict with China that ensued through the rest of that decade. To
prepare against the threat of conflict with Japan, they developed War
Plan Orange, a strategy premised on the idea that the United States
might go to war alone against Japan. War Plan Orange contemplated
an aggressive American naval campaign in the western Pacific near
the Japanese Islands themselves.38 It did not envision significant
action in the eastern Pacific, or a Japanese assault on the West Coast
of the United States.39
37. 2 CTR. OF MILITARY HISTORY, AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 64 (Richard W.
Stewart ed., 2005).
38. Louis Morton, Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War
II, in COMMAND DECISIONS 11, 14 (Kent Roberts Greenfield ed., 1960); see HENRY G.
GOLE, THE ROAD TO RAINBOW: ARMY PLANNING FOR GLOBAL WAR, 1934-1940, at
85-91, 95-101 (2003).
39. In WAR PLAN ORANGE: THE U.S. STRATEGY TO DEFEAT JAPAN 1897-1945
(1991), Edward S. Miller notes that analysts in the Naval War College in 1911 "were
1339
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Changing world conditions in the 1930s, both in Europe and in
the Far East, led American war planners to abandon their color-
coded plans for solo American military action in favor of a new set of
plans that envisioned the United States engaging in a two-ocean war,
in the company of allies, against multiple enemies.' Dubbed
"Rainbow," these strategies took the form of five numbered plans
that envisioned five distinct scenarios of American military
involvement in war against the Axis Powers in both the Atlantic and
the Pacific.41 "Rainbow 5" was the plan that came closest to
approximating the conditions that actually developed in December of
1941.42 Under the assumptions of Rainbow 5, the United States would
go to war against the Axis Powers in concert with Great Britain and
France; American forces would first assure the defense of American
dominance in the Western Hemisphere and then project themselves
in the Atlantic against the European Axis nations.43 American forces
would maintain a posture of strategic defense in the Pacific until
success in Europe allowed the redeployment of American power for
aggressive operations against Japan in the Pacific.' The fall of France
to the Nazis in June of 1940 rendered Rainbow 5's assumption of an
alliance with France moot, but American planners, with President
Roosevelt's acceptance, nonetheless continued to develop Rainbow 5
as the likeliest plan for war.45 Thus, when the sun set on December 6,
1941, the American military had plans on hand for the eventuality of
an aggressive engagement in the Atlantic and a defensive position in
the Pacific designed to sustain the country's key strategic positions
along a huge triangle stretching from Panama in the south to Hawaii
in the west and Alaska in the north.'
The events of December 7, 1941, obviously complicated the
assumptions of Rainbow 5. Japan's simultaneous and successful
attacks on the U.S. Far East Air Force in the Philippines and the U.S.
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor dealt a blow to the American strategic
position in the central and western Pacific and stripped the United
confident that an invasion was 'too fantastic to be seriously contemplated.' " Id. at 41
(quoting NAVAL WAR COLL., STRATEGIC PLAN OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST ORANGE 6-7
(Mar. 15, 1911), microformed on Roll 1, 2(b) (Scholarly Microfilms)). Miller notes
parenthetically that "[h]ysterical leaders who uprooted loyal Japanese-Americans from
the West Coast in 1942 would have benefited from reading these cool assessments." Id.
40. See Morton, supra note 38, at 22-23.
41. See id. at 23.
42. See id. at 25.
43. See id. at 24.
44. Seeid.
45. See id. at 44-46.
46. See id. at 47.
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States of its capacity for offensive action against Japan.47 Hawaii had
been one corner of the defensive triangle that Rainbow 5 imagined,
and that plan did not contemplate the destruction or disabling of
eight battleships and hundreds of airplanes there. 48 Nonetheless,
Rainbow 5 was still the war plan that most closely mirrored the
strategic situation confronting the United States, and so that was the
plan that the military activated.49
The implementation of Rainbow 5 made for big changes in the
Western Defense Command ("WDC"), a unit within the army that
the War Department had activated in June of 1941 for the defense of
the region including Washington, Oregon, California, Montana,
Nevada, and Arizona.5" Upon learning of the extent of the damage to
the Pacific Fleet, Lieutenant General John DeWitt, the commanding
general of the WDC, raised the defense level from Category B, which
was what Rainbow 5 had contemplated with an intact Pacific Fleet in
Hawaii, to Category C.51 This category saw "minor attacks" as
"probable," rather than merely "possible" as Category B did,52 and
required, in addition to the deployment of defenses of harbors and
key industrial facilities, "the manning of primary seacoast artillery
armament on a 24-hour a day basis, the establishment of outposts
along sensitive shoreline areas outside Harbor Defenses, and the
inauguration of extensive beach patrols."53 Rumors of sightings of
enemy submarines, ships, and planes spread quickly. All were quickly
debunked, but in this atmosphere of post-Pearl Harbor alarm, the
War Department decided to elevate the WDC's status to a "theater of
operations" on December 11, 1941, the day that Germany declared
war on the United States.54 This designation carried clout. A theater
of operations was, in effect, a combat zone over which a commanding
general had near-total authority.55 The Army rushed nine anti-aircraft
regiments to the WDC by December 17, 1941, as well as two divisions
47. See 2 CTR. OF MILITARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 77-78.
48. See id. at 78.
49. See STETSON CONN ET AL., GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS
80 (2000).
50. See 1 W. DEF. COMMAND, HISTORY OF THE WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND 1
(1945).
51. See CONN ET AL., supra note 49, at 80-81.
52. See id. at 81-82; 1 W. DEF. COMMAND, supra note 50, at 12.
53. 1 W. DEF. COMMAND, supra note 50, at 12.
54. See CONN ET AL., supra note 49, at 83.
55. See Memorandum from Brigadier Gen. Mark W. Clark to Gen. George Marshall 2
(Jan. 27, 1942), microformed on Reel 50, Item 1766 (George C. Marshall Research Center
[hereinafter Marshall Center Microfilm]).
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and a number of combat and support regiments.56 By the end of the
year, some 250,000 U.S. troops were in the WDC on patrolling, anti-
aircraft, and anti-sabotage duties. 7 This did not satisfy General
DeWitt, the WDC Commander; he continued to press his superiors
for more. 8
The FBI and the Justice Department also took action against
sabotage and espionage in the days after Pearl Harbor. Using lists of
potentially dangerous aliens they had compiled in anticipation of war,
agents swept through the Japanese population centers of the West
Coast as early as the evening of December 7, arresting Japanese,
German, and Italian enemy aliens on their lists. 9 Within days, several
thousand aliens were in Justice Department detention, of whom a
large majority-some two thousand-were Japanese.' From that
point on, the Justice Department took the position that these
detentions of aliens, coupled with certain additional regulations
requiring enemy aliens to submit to searches and surrender certain
radios and cameras, were a sufficient response to the rather limited
threat of espionage and sabotage that the FBI believed the West
Coast's Japanese and Japanese American population presented.61
Despite looming public fears, Japanese military operations near
the West Coast in the months after Pearl Harbor were minimal,
confined to a few submarine ventures. Four submarines perpetrated
eight or nine attacks on shipping off the California coast, sinking two
tankers and damaging a freighter.62 On February 23, 1942-four days
after President Roosevelt signed the executive order that authorized
the exclusion of Japanese Americans-one of those four Japanese
submarines surfaced a mile and a half off the coast near Santa
Barbara and lobbed thirteen rounds of ammunition at an oil refinery,
causing negligible damage.63 Japan's efforts closer to home during this
time period were, on the other hand, far more numerous, intense, and
56. See CONN ET AL., supra note 49, at 83.
57. See id. at 83-84.
58. See 1 W. DEF. COMMAND, supra note 50, at 14 ("Troop requirements greatly
exceeded the number of units available and all requests for additional troop assignments
could not be filled.").
59. See TETSUDEN KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICAN
IMPRISONMENT DURING WORLD WAR 1147-48 (2003).
60. See ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 303 (2d ed. 2002).
61. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 27-58 (tracing the Justice Department's attempts to
resist plans to exclude all Japanese resident aliens and Japanese Americans from the West
Coast).
62. See CONN ET AL., supra note 49, at 86-87.
63. See id.
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successful. By the end of April of 1942, the Japanese controlled
"Burma, Malaya, Thailand, French Indochina, the Netherlands
Indies, ... the Malay Archipelago, ... the islands of New Guinea,
New Britain, and ... the Solomons,"' were well on their way to
control of the Philippines,65 and were in a position to menace
Australia and New Zealand.66
Notwithstanding this string of Japanese successes, General
DeWitt at the Presidio in San Francisco did not initially favor
restrictive action against American citizens of Japanese ancestry,
even though he distrusted them.67 His principal concern in December
and much of January was to seek authority for more aggressive
restrictions on enemy aliens rather than citizens of suspect ancestry.68
However, in January pressure began to mount for action against
citizens as well. Some of this pressure came from Provost Marshall
General Allen Gullion and his aide Captain (soon Colonel) Karl R.
Bendetsen; some of it came from nativist groups and agricultural
organizations that had wanted to force the Japanese out for years;
some of it came from the West Coast's congressional delegations and
state political leaders; some of it came from the public's response to
the publication of an investigative report implying (falsely, as would
later be learned) that espionage by Japanese Americans had
contributed to the Pearl Harbor attack; and some of it came from a
rabid press.69 As January turned to February, Justice Department
lawyers Edward Ennis and James Rowe struggled to defeat the
military's incipient proposal to evict not just Japanese aliens but
American citizens from the coast.7" They failed; the War Department
had the upper hand in the interagency battle and managed, by
February 11, to secure the President's agreement to a program of
exclusion of aliens and citizens alike.71 With the support of a
64. 2 CTR. OF MILITARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 89.
65. See id. at 89-92.
66. See id. at 89.
67. See GREG ROBINSON, A TRAGEDY OF DEMOCRACY: JAPANESE CONFINEMENT
IN NORTH AMERICA 66-67 (2009).
68. See id. at 68-69.
69. See id. at 68-73. The scholarship on these various factors that led to the military's
decision for mass exclusion of citizens is deep. In addition to Peter Irons's Justice at War,
important works include PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 11, at 25-116; ROGER
DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA 186-282 (1988); MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS
BETRAYED 19-225 (1949); GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT 8-124
(2001); JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 11-208
(4th prtg. 1970); MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY 33-155 (1976).
70. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 42-45, 61-62.
71. See id. at 62-64.
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recommendation, signed by DeWitt but drafted by Bendetsen, that
called "[tihe Japanese race ... an enemy race," President Roosevelt
signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942.72 That order gave
the Secretary of War, and through him General DeWitt, the blanket
authority to "prescribe military areas ... from which any or all
persons may be excluded."73
Empowered by the executive order, the military now moved
against Japanese aliens and Americans of Japanese ancestry. The first
move was to secure legislation from Congress to enforce the curfew
and exclusion orders that the military was planning to announce. On
February 22, 1942, Karl Bendetsen of the Provost Marshal General's
Office submitted to Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy a draft
of legislation that would make it a felony punishable by up to five
years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine for a "person to 'enter, leave,
or remain in' any military area" from which a military order had
barred him.74 This was a bit too harsh for McCloy; he converted the
crime to a misdemeanor and trimmed the maximum term to one year
before passing the bill along to the House and Senate armed services
committees on March 9.75 Committee consideration of the bill in both
committees was lightning fast, and both houses of Congress passed it
on voice votes on March 19.76 Two days later, on March 21, President
Roosevelt signed it into law as Public Law 503.7" From that moment
on, it was a federal misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in jail
and a $5,000 fine for any person knowingly to "enter, remain in,
leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone
prescribed ... by any military commander designated by the
Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such
area or zone or contrary to the order of ... any such military
commander."78
Then, quickly, came the restrictions. On March 24, General
DeWitt signed Public Proclamation Number 3, which ordered all
72. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 11, at 82-85.
73. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
74. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 65 (quoting Memorandum from Karl Bendetsen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, Wartime Civil Control Admin., to John J. McCloy, Assistant
Sec'y of War, War Dep't (Feb. 22, 1942), microformed on Box 6, RG 107 (National
Archives and Records Administration [hereinafter NARA]).
75. See id. at 65-66.
76. See id. at 67-68.
77. See Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 97a (Supp. II 1942), recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 1383 (1952)), repealed by Act of Sept. 14,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 501(e), 90 Stat. 1258.
78. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173, 173, repealed by Act
of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 683, 868.
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alien enemies and American citizens of Japanese (but not German or
Italian) ancestry to stay home from 8:00 in the evening to 6:00 in the
morning and to stay within a five-mile circle of their homes and
workplaces during the day.79 That same day, he also signed the first of
what would be many months' worth of Civilian Exclusion Orders
directing Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry
to leave their homes.' ° This began the odyssey of detention for
Japanese Americans, an ordeal that would take them behind barbed
wire and last for more than four years.8'
On the evening of March 28, 1942, Minoru Yasui, a Japanese
American attorney in Portland, Oregon, began walking up and down
his city's streets in the hope that he would be arrested for violating
the curfew provision in Public Proclamation Number 3. He even had
his secretary phone the police to alert them that he was out and about
after curfew. But when no police officer would oblige, Yasui walked
into a precinct house and demanded to be arrested. The police
agreed, and a test case of the lawfulness of the curfew was born.82
Yasui was joined in protest early in May by Gordon Hirabayashi,
a senior at the University of Washington in Seattle. Wishing to create
a test case of the military order directing him to report for exclusion
from the coast, which he viewed as illegal and immoral, Hirabayashi
turned himself in to the FBI in Seattle on May 16, 1942, bringing with
him a diary that detailed not only his refusal to report for exclusion
but also repeated violations of the curfew over the preceding days.
The FBI placed Hirabayashi under arrest that day; later in the month
a federal grand jury indicted Hirabayashi for two violations of Public
Law 503, one for resisting exclusion and one for violating the
curfew.83
A third test case materialized on May 30, 1942, when police in
San Leandro, California, picked up Fred Korematsu on suspicion of
violating the military's exclusion order. Korematsu initially pretended
not to be Japanese American; indeed, he had had plastic surgery in
March in order to conceal his ethnic identity. But his story did not
hold up, and officers were able to confirm that he was Japanese
79. Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Apr. 2, 1942).
80. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 70.
81. The story of the detention of Japanese Americans in so-called "assembly centers"
in the summer of 1942 and in so-called "relocation centers" from the fall of 1942 into 1945
is beyond the scope of this Article, but has been told in other works. For one example, see
MULLER, supra note 13, at 22-40.
82. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 81-87.
83. See id. at 87-92; James A. Hirabayashi, Four Hirabayashi Cousins, in NIKKEI IN
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 146, 155-58 (Louis Fiset & Gail M. Nomura eds., 2005).
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American and had not complied with a May 9 military order directing
him to report for detention at the assembly center at the Tanforan
Racetrack south of San Francisco. He too was charged with a
misdemeanor under Public Law 503.4
By the end of 1942, all three of these Japanese American
resisters had been convicted in federal district courts. Their
challenges would soon move to the appellate courts and the United
States Supreme Court. Although Hirabayashi was the last of the three
men to be tried, his was, for procedural reasons, the first case that the
Supreme Court reached on the merits."
II. DEFENDING THE CURFEW IN COURT: THE CENTRALITY OF A
THREATENED JAPANESE INVASION
The government lawyers assigned to defend the constitutionality
of General DeWitt's orders in the Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu
cases had a clear-cut, two-step case to make. First, they had to
demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that, at the time of the orders,
the military was confronting a grave external threat to the West Coast
of the United States. Second, they had to show that military officials
had a reasonable foundation to believe that American citizens of
Japanese ancestry, as a group, posed enough of an internal risk in the
context of that external threat to warrant the orders of mass curfew
and exclusion. The difficulty for the government lawyers lay in the
problem of proof: how to sustain these criminal provisions of Public
Law 503 without laying bare volumes of top-secret military and
intelligence information about those external and internal risks?
The solution to this problem began to take shape very early, in
the preparation for the first of the criminal trials, Minoru Yasui's, in
Portland, Oregon, in June of 1942. Maurice Walk, a lawyer with the
newly formed War Relocation Authority ("WRA"), proposed to the
United States Attorney handling Yasui's trial that the government try
to prove as much of its case as possible through the doctrine of
"judicial notice."86 At the time, this doctrine allowed a court to take
84. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 93-99; OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE FRED
KOREMATSU STORY (POV 2000).
85. Korematsu's case did not reach the Court on the merits until the fall of 1944
because the Supreme Court first needed to determine whether the trial court's order was
final and appealable. See Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 433-36 (1943). Yasui's
case was argued in the Supreme Court alongside Hirabayashi's, and the Court decided it
the same day, but on the question of the constitutionality of the curfew, the Court simply
invoked by reference its reasoning in the Hirabayashi case. See Yasui v. United States, 320
U.S. 115, 117 (1943).
86. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 137-38.
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as proven those facts which it saw as being so "notorious ''7 as to be
"generally known, ' without first taking any actual testimony on
those facts.89 The United States Attorney adopted this suggestion at
the Yasui trial, presenting most of its case on the issues of both
external and internal threat through a memorandum of law rather
than trial testimony.90 Later, the Solicitor General of the United
States would embrace this "judicial notice" approach in its own
submissions to the Supreme Court in all of the Japanese American
cases.
91
Relieved of the obligation to present specific testimonial or
documentary evidence on the military threat to the West Coast in
early 1942, government lawyers focused from the start on one
external threat to the near-total exclusion of any other: the threat of a
Japanese invasion. This section of the Article documents this
emphasis on invasion. It does so at the risk of redundancy; the
references to invasion in the government's briefs and oral arguments
were constant, and in this telling they may become tedious. But the
recurring detail is necessary to show how divorced from reality the
government's factual submissions were.
The premise of a threatened Japanese invasion of the West Coast
appeared in the very earliest moments of the government's
strategizing of the defense of General DeWitt's orders. In the early
June 1942 memorandum that WRA attorney Maurice Walk wrote to
the United States Attorney in Portland on the Yasui case, he urged
the prosecutor to contend that it would be "impossible to predict how
[Japanese Americans] w[ould] act if a Japanese army of racial
brothers were landed upon our shores. 92 This is just the approach that
87. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1922).
88. Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42 (1875).
89. Since that time, the principle of judicial notice has been codified in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
90. See Memorandum of Law, United States v. Yasui, No. C-16056 (W.D. Or.
undated), microformed on Papers of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians [hereinafter CWRIC Papers], Reel 7, frames 259-98 (NARA)
[hereinafter Yasui Memorandum].
91. Justice Department attorney Nanette Dembitz authored an internal memorandum
advocating this approach in 1943, as the Solicitor General's Office geared up to defend the
Yasui and Hirabayashi convictions. See Memorandum from Nanette Dembitz, Attorney,
War Dep't, to John L. Burling, Attorney, War Dep't (Aug. 11, 1942), microformed on
CWRIC Papers, Reel 5, frames 291-308 (NARA). The Solicitor General's Office adopted
Dembitz's suggestion in framing the briefs in those cases. See, e.g., Hirabayashi Brief,
supra note 21, at 11; see also Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military
Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175,
185 (1945) (noting the government's use of the "judicial notice" doctrine).
92. IRONS, supra note 15, at 138 (emphasis added).
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the prosecutor took; his memorandum of law argued that "the
question [was] what type of conduct can reasonably be expected of
those of Japanese ancestry now or in case of an attempted invasion by
the Imperial Japanese forces of our coastal areas. 9 3 Rather than
commit the government to a specific factual claim, the prosecutor
proceeded by rhetorical questions and hypotheticals, but they all
proceeded from the premise of a Japanese invasion. "Suppose," the
prosecutor wrote, "that the area encompassed by Lieutenant General
DeWitt's orders should be suddenly subjected to an airborne
invasion."94 In such a case, the prosecutor asked, wouldn't a Japanese
American likely sympathize with the efforts of "the Japanese war
machine?""5 Might not "the military and citizenry, fighting for its very
life, ... attack and attempt to kill all persons of Japanese ancestry in
such a confused area of operations?"96 Noting, presumably, the
Japanese occupation in early June 1942, of two islands at the end of
the Aleutian chain, the government's memorandum noted that
"[t]here has been actual invasion[,] and a further invasion may take
place at any moment."97 In light of this threat to "the territorial and
political integrity of the United States," 9 the memorandum argued,
"[f]rom a military standpoint there was no alternative to the
establishment"99 of the mass curfew on Japanese Americans.
When the Yasui and Hirabayashi cases reached the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the responsibility for briefing
and argument shifted from the local United States Attorneys in
Portland and Seattle to Edward Ennis, the director of the Justice
Department's Alien Enemy Control Unit. Ennis, a New Deal liberal
and civil libertarian who had occupied many important Justice
Department positions since 1937,"° was a fierce internal critic of the
military's Japanese American program since its inception, and had
privately fought against War Department officials to stave off mass
action against Japanese Americans in January and February of
1942.01 But in defending the misdemeanor convictions of Yasui and
Hirabayashi in the court of appeals on February 20, 1943, Ennis
emphasized the external threat of a Japanese invasion of the West
93. Yasui Memorandum, supra note 90, at 6 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id. at 6-7.
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id. at 29.
100. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 14-15.
101. See id. at 42-46, 61-63.
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Coast. Under tough questioning from a skeptical appellate judge
about the absence of subversive activity by Japanese Americans
before or since the Pearl Harbor attack, Ennis conceded that there
had been no such activity, but argued that the internal threat of even
a little bit of such activity had to be considered in the context of the
enormous external threat the coast was facing. Ennis urged the court
to appreciate the "incalculable damage" that "even ... only a few
hundred" American citizens of Japanese ancestry could have done if
they had supported a Japanese invasion of the West Coast.l"
Once the cases reached the United States Supreme Court, the
government's invasion theory blossomed even more fully. The
government's merits brief in Hirabayashi, drafted by a team of
several lawyers including Ennis, emphasized at the outset that while
"[t]he exact and detailed military situation affecting the Pacific Coast
after the attack on Pearl Harbor .. . was a close and guarded military
secret," a number of "publicly known" facts about the military
situation supported General DeWitt's actions. 3 One of these facts
was that "the Island of Oahu constituted the ... last stronghold of
defense lying between Japan and the West Coast;" because of the
attack on Pearl Harbor at Oahu, the brief argued, "at the time of the
initiation of the evacuation program here in issue, it was the utmost
military importance to prepare against an invasion of the Pacific
Coast" and to consider "whether any condition existed within the
West Coast area which might obstruct its successful defense in the
event of an attempted invasion.""
The brief contended specifically that it was "[t]he events which
had occurred between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the enactment
of [Public Law 503] on March 21, 1942" that "amply warranted" the
legislation."' Military developments during that time period created a
''military situation [that] was so grave" as to place "the danger of an
enemy attack ... far within the realm of probability.""° The military
was therefore "[f]aced with the responsibility of repelling a possible
Japanese invasion which might have threatened the very integrity of
our nation" in a situation where the disloyalty of even a small number
of Japanese Americans "might spell the difference between the
102. Lawrence E. Davies, Upholds Japanese in Citizens' Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21,
1943, at 23. This newspaper article is the only extant account of the oral argument in the
Ninth Circuit; no transcript survives.
103. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 21, at 15.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 45.
106. Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added).
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success or failure of any attempted invasion."'' 7 In such an emergency,
loyalty screening would not work: "What was needed was a method
of removing at once the unknown number of Japanese persons who
might assist a Japanese invasion, and not a program for sifting out
such persons in the indefinite future."' 8 "A hearing to determine
what a particular Japanese would do in the event that the Japanese
forces should succeed in effecting a landing on the Pacific Coast"
would have been impracticable, the government's brief maintained."°
Such a hearing would have had to probe deeply the mind of that
person to determine whether it could be freed from "the ties of
kinship or other intangible forces which might bind him to the
members of an invading Japanese army."' 0 The emergency facing the
coast did not leave the military time for such a complex luxury.
The government's brief also invoked this supposedly threatened
invasion in responding to Hirabayashi's claim that General DeWitt's
orders discriminated on the basis of race by singling out Japanese
Americans. "The objection that the exclusion measure was invalid
because it did not include Italians and Germans is without
substance," the government argued, because "[t]he principal danger
to be apprehended was a Japanese invasion, and the possible
assistance to attacking Japanese forces would be most likely to come
from the Japanese residing on the West Coast."'' It was no denial of
due process, according to the government, for the military to "strike
at the evil where it [was] most felt.""'
The threat of a Japanese invasion appears to have pervaded
Solicitor General Charles Fahy's oral argument to the Supreme Court
in the Hirabayashi case as well. We cannot be completely certain of
the precise words that Fahy used at argument because no verbatim
transcript survives."' But a lengthy summary of the argument,
including directly quoted passages, appeared in the United States Law
Week shortly after the argument," 4 and a transcript of Fahy's oral
presentation to the Court a year later in the Korematsu case does
survive." 5 From these sources, we can be certain that Fahy's
107. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. See Peter Irons, Fancy Dancing in the Marble Palace, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 35, 37-
38 (1986).
114. 11 U.S.L.W. 3345 (1943).
115. See Transcript of Solicitor General's Oral Argument, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1943) (No. 22), reprinted in Irons, supra note 113, at 46, 46-60.
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Hirabayashi argument only intensified the government's focus on
invasion.
The issue of invasion first arose at the Hirabayashi argument not
in the Solicitor General's argument, but in that of Hirabayashi's
attorney, Harold Evans, as he tried to persuade the Court that Public
Law 503 had excessively and unconstitutionally delegated legislative
authority over civilians to the military. Evans noted that a Civil-War-
era precedent, Ex parte Milligan,"6 had struck down military
jurisdiction over civilians and distinguished zones of military
operations, where military authority over civilians might be
permissible, from zones of no imminent conflict, where military
authority over civilians was impermissible. Justice Reed reacted
skeptically to Evans's use of Milligan: if Milligan made clear that
Congress and the President could together authorize martial law
where the proper conditions exist, he asked, then wasn't the
distinction in Milligan inapplicable in Hirabayashi's challenge to a
military regulation along the West Coast, where, presumably, those
conditions existed? Evans replied bluntly: "[I]t must be remembered
that Hawaii is 2,400 miles from the Coast, Midway 1,300 miles, and
Attu [at the tip of the Aleutian chain] 2,600 miles. It cannot be said
because of the military activity in those areas that California was
about to be invaded." Justice Douglas was not persuaded. Wasn't the
question of whether California was about to be invaded "within the
exercise of military judgment," he asked. Evans replied that it was
not, and that the simple distances the Japanese military would have to
travel to launch an invasion "sp[oke] for themselves."" 7
Solicitor General Fahy did nothing to dispel the apparent
impression of Justices Reed and Douglas that the military could
reasonably have anticipated an invasion at the time of General
DeWitt's challenged orders. Instead he upped the ante, characterizing
the conditions facing the United States in the Pacific at that time as
"the most serious threat that had ever occurred in [the country's]
history."' 8 According to the reporter for United States Law Week,
Fahy contended that
[w]ith the threat of invasion, ... the well-known use of the
technique of the fifth column, the prevalence of sabotage in the
Pearl Harbor attack, the widespread successes of the Japanese
armed forces, [and] the alien character of at least one-third of
the Japanese on the West Coast,... it was not unreasonable for
116. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
117. 11 U.S.L.W. at 3346.
118. Id. at 3347.
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those charged with the defense of the West Coast to fear that in
case of an invasion there would be among this group of people
a number of persons who might assist the enemy.119
The dry account of the Hirabayashi argument in the United States
Law Week could not capture the Solicitor General's spirit and tone in
communicating this claim about a Japanese invasion. Seventeen
months later, however, Solicitor General Fahy presented oral
argument to the Court in the Korematsu case, and the surviving
transcript of that argument hints at his forcefulness on the subject. In
Korematsu, the Court took up the question of the constitutionality of
the mass exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast and
of their detention in the camps. 20 In the context of assailing the
supposed military basis for General DeWitt's orders, counsel for
Korematsu emphasized the American victory at Midway in early June
of 1942.121 The Solicitor General scoffed at the notion that the
Midway victory was relevant to the validity of General DeWitt's
exclusion orders. "It is difficult to see how, because of the battle of
Midway in June, ... the threat of invasion of the Pacific Coast in the
winter of 1941 and 1942 could have been said not to have existed." 2
Fahy pressed on: "If it be true that the battle of Midway did stop or
retard the threat of invasion after those measures had been taken, it
cannot be said that prior to that there had not been a threat of
invasion. "123 And here Fahy unsheathed his sharpest rhetorical sword.
If, he maintained, someone wished to say that no threat of coastal
invasion existed before Midway, "let it be said to those who turned
back that ... threat, if they can be reached where they lie at the
bottom of the Pacific Ocean, among the hulls of the warships which
went down with them in that battle.' 1 24 Even the ghosts of American
119. Id.
120. The Court resolved only the exclusion issue in Korematsu, leaving the detention
issue for resolution on non-constitutional grounds in Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 283-307
(1944). See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1944). For more on what
may have led the Court to handle the issues of curfew, exclusion, and detention in this
sequential fashion, see Kang, supra note 17, at 948-55, 958-65.
121. No transcript of Korematsu's attorneys' presentation to the Court survives,
neither did a summary of the argument appear in United States Law Week. The only extant
account of the petitioners' portion of the argument is the one that Peter Irons was able to
reconstruct from sketchy notes taken by a courtroom spectator that he found in the
National Archives. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 312-14. It is also possible to infer certain
themes in Korematsu's attorneys' presentation from the surviving transcript of the
Solicitor General's oral argument. See Transcript of Solicitor General's Oral Argument,
supra note 115, at 46-60.
122. Transcript of Solicitor General's Oral Argument, supra note 115, at 49.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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sailors came to court that day to testify to the threat of a Japanese
invasion.
In all of the government's briefing and argument in the
Hirabayashi case, there was but a single sentence that raised the
specter of any external threat to the coast short of an outright
invasion. It was a sentence in the portion of the government's brief
that summarized the facts of "the military situation on the Pacific
coast" 25 of which the government wished the Court to take judicial
notice. After noting that "it was [of] the utmost military importance
to prepare against an invasion of the Pacific Coast" and "incumbent
to consider" whether anything might hinder its defense "in the event
of an attempted invasion," the government added that "[t]here was
also a danger, even in the absence of attempted invasion, of bombing
raids on the West Coast, particularly in view of the American raid
over Japan for which reprisal raids seemed possible.' 26 It was this
"threat of invasion and attack" which "inevitably created
apprehension of the use by the enemy of the so-called fifth column
technique of warfare. ' 127 This lone reference to possible bombing
raids did little to detract from the overall thrust of the government's
argument that the chief danger to which General DeWitt's orders
responded was a landing of a Japanese invasion force on the territory
of California, Oregon, or Washington.
The government's emphasis on a Japanese invasion was not lost
on the Justices of the Supreme Court. In the published opinions,
Justice Douglas's concurrence drove home the threat of invasion
most forcefully. "The threat of Japanese invasion of the west coast
was not fanciful but real," Justice Douglas maintained, citing no
authority but presumably relying on the government's
representations of the military situation.1" He approvingly cited the
opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oregon in Yasui v. United States for the propositions that all of the
zones subject to General DeWitt's orders were " 'threatened during
125. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 21, at 12.
126. Id. at 15. The "American raid over Japan" to which the brief referred was the so-
called "Doolittle Raid" of April 18, 1942, in which sixteen U.S. bombers took off from an
aircraft carrier in the mid-Pacific and bombed industrial sites in Tokyo, Yokohama,
Yokuska, Nagoya, Kobe, and Osaka. See generally DUANE P. SCHULTZ, THE DOOLITTLE
RAID (1988) (providing a comprehensive history of the raid).
127. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 21, at 16.
128. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943) (Douglas, J., concurring). It
is also possible that Justice Douglas derived some of his confidence from his own
extracurricular contacts with John DeWitt. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 238 ("Douglas
encountered DeWitt on the West Coast the previous summer and he filled him with
horrible stories about Japanese submarines lurking off the coast.").
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this period with a full scale invasion,' " a danger that was " 'imminent
and immediate.' "129 In Justice Douglas's view, "national survival
[was] at stake""13 with " 'invasion imminent.' "131
Chief Justice Stone's majority opinion was only slightly less
emphatic in taking judicial notice that the West Coast was facing a
threat of Japanese invasion. It "c[ould] not be doubted," he wrote for
the Court, that military officials "had ample ground for concluding
that they must face the danger of invasion.' 1 32 In this "time of war and
threatened invasion," military officials did not violate the
Constitution by drawing a racial line that would be impermissible in
calmer times.13  After all, experience showed that those with "ethnic
affiliations with an invading enemy" posed "a greater source of
danger than those of a different ancestry," said the Chief Justice."3
The majority opinion did hedge its bets a bit more than Justice
Douglas's concurrence; twice it referenced a possibility of "air raids"
alongside that of invasion.'35 But the central risk-and the central
justification for the race-based curfew-was invasion. In an important
passage, Chief Justice Stone acknowledged that a "[d]istinction
between citizens solely because of their ancestry" such as the one that
General DeWitt's curfew order drew was "odious to a free people"
and ordinarily "a denial of equal protection."' 36 That principle "would
be controlling" in Hirabayashi, the Chief Justice wrote, "were it not
for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war
and of threatened invasion," required military officials to "scrutinize
every relevant fact bearing on ... loyalty," including ancestry.' The
threat to the territorial integrity of the United States was just too big
for ordinary equal protection principles to apply.
III. "DEFENDING AGAINST VERY LITTLE OR NOTHING": THE REAL
SITUATION ON THE WEST COAST
On February 20, 1942, as the ink dried on Executive Order 9066,
the office of General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff,
received an urgent message from British Field Marshal Sir John
129. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 105 n.1 (quoting United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40,
44-45 (W.D. Or. 1942)).
130. Id. at 106.
131. Id. at 105 n.1 (quoting United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 45 (W.D. Or. 1942)).
132. Id. at 94 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 100.
134. Id. at 101.
135. See id. at 94, 99.
136. Id. at 100.
137. Id.
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Greer Dill.138 Dill, who was serving as Britain's chief military
representative in the United States, reported to Marshall that officials
in Ottawa would soon be debating the defense of Canada's Pacific
coast, and that in that connection the Canadian Chief of General Staff
had "raised ... [t]he question of the scale of attack on the West
Coast." '139 Dill sought confirmation from Marshall of the validity of
the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, which he quoted:
So long as the United States maintain a battle fleet in the
Pacific, large scale seaborne expeditions against the western
seaboard of North America and the employment of capital ship
forces in this area are considered impracticable. The most
probable enemy threat is carrier-borne air attacks and sporadic
naval bombardment, but a small scale destructive raid cannot
be ignored. In view of the great distances over which these
operations would have to be undertaken it is probably not
necessary to provide a strong scale of defence except at selected
points of great importance which can be covered by the normal
form of coast and air defenses supplemented by mobile land
and air striking forces.14
Later that same day, Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
the Assistant Chief of Staff, sent a note to Dill explaining that
Marshall had been called away from the office but quoting the precise
reply he gave before he left: "I am in concurrence with the
conclusions of the British Chiefs of Staff with reference to the
Japanese threat to the West Coast.""14
In truth, the British Chiefs of Staff's assessment was an
overstatement of the Japanese risk to the coast that American
military planners and intelligence officials estimated and were
preparing to meet. A variety of formerly secret and classified
documents from the period between December of 1941 and March of
1942 reveal that a Japanese invasion of the West Coast was not, as
Justice Douglas later wrote in his Hirabayashi concurrence, a "real"
and "imminent" threat, but virtually no threat at all.
138. Letter from J.G. Dill, Field Marshal, British Army, to George C. Marshall, Chief
of Staff, War Dep't (Feb. 20, 1942), microformed on Reel 27, Item 1157 (Marshall Center
Microfilm).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Memorandum from Dwight D. Eisenhower, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Dep't,
to J.G. Dill, Field Marshal, British Army (Feb. 20, 1942), microformed on Reel 27, Item
1157 (Marshall Center Microfilm).
2010] 1355
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Within the U.S. Army, intelligence about enemy operations was
the province of G-2, its intelligence division.14 2 That division produced
a stream of secret reports cataloguing enemy activity in all theaters of
operation and describing "enemy capabilities" for future action. A
review of the reports from the relevant time period reveals that G-2
never even mentioned the possibility of an invasion of the West
Coast.
From December 10, 1941, through December 23, 1941, G-2
reported only sporadic enemy submarine activity off the Pacific Coast
and virtually no enemy activity in Hawaii. 143 In its December 23
summary, G-2 listed the following as "enemy capabilities":
(1) Surprise attacks against HAWAII or any portion of the
PACIFIC COAST, including the PANAMA CANAL and
ALASKA, by air, or possibly, by naval action.
(2) Harassing attacks by submarines or surface craft, including
commerce raiders, against shipping in the Pacific Ocean east of
1700 West Meridian.
(3) Greatly intensified attacks of MALAYA, BORNEO and
PHILIPPINES and other objectives in the FAR EAST.
(4) Attacks on the Maritime Provinces of eastern SIBERIA to
eliminate menacing Russian air power, while continuing action
elsewhere. 44
G-2 noted, however, that "negative reports" as to items (1) and
(4) on the list-attacks on the Pacific Coast and Siberia-led "to the
assumption that Japan [would] confine itself" to items (2) and (3) "for
the present. 145
Intelligence reports remained more or less the same in the period
from December 24, 1941, through January 3, 1942141: sporadic
suspicions of submarine activity off the Pacific Coast and around
Hawaii and, on January 1, certain "indications" of surface vessels
"both near and distant from the California coast" that went
142. See BRUCE BIDWELL, HISTORY OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF, 1775-1941, at 117 (1986).
143. See G-2 Estimates Nos. 5-18, Dec. 10-23, 1941, at 1, National Archives and
Records Administration, College Park, Maryland [hereinafter NARA College Park],
Record Group [hereinafter RG] 499, Entry 128.
144. G-2 Estimate No. 17, 4:00 PM 22 Dec. to 10:00 PM 23 Dec., at 2, NARA College
Park, RG 499, Entry 128.
145. Id.
146. See G-2 Estimates Nos. 19-27, Dec. 24, 1941 to Jan. 3, 1942, at 1, NARA College
Park, RG 499, Entry 128.
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uncorroborated. 47 G-2's overall estimate of "enemy capabilities" in
this period did not change. "Surprise attacks" along the coast by
carrier-borne aircraft, possibly accompanied by naval action,
remained a Japanese "capability," the intelligence division reported
on January 3, 1942, but G-2 did not believe that the Japanese military
actually contemplated such activity at the time. 48
On January 14, 1942, G-2 reported speculation that the "Axis"
might be planning a "surprise attack with dramatic timing against our
important installations including important aircraft industries and
naval establishments either in the continental UNITED STATES or
elsewhere" in order to subvert pan-American unity in connection
with a conference opening in Rio de Janeiro on January 15.149 But we
know that G-2 did not think much of this speculation, because that
day it revised downward the likelihood of enemy activity in its
assessment of "enemy capabilities." While it continued to note an
abstract capability of "surprise attacks" by air, but not by land, along
the coast, which the Japanese did not intend to pursue, G-2 removed
"harassing attacks by submarines or surface craft ... against
shipping" from the list of actions the enemy was likely planning. 5°
For the next month, G-2's estimates of enemy capability
remained the same. G-2 reported speculation of occasional enemy
submarine activity, but little was confirmed, and G-2 noted
repeatedly that "no hostile ground forces [we]re believed to be nearer
than ... about 2000 miles west by south of the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.1' 51 The only predicted enemy activity in the Pacific was
intensified attacks along its western rim; G-2 did not anticipate
"surprise attacks" along the West Coast of the United States by air or
sea, harassment of shipping, or attacks on Siberia. 52
A Japanese submarine's shelling of an oil refinery near Santa
Barbara, California, on February 23, 1942153 led G-2 to upgrade its
assessment of enemy capabilities slightly. In its periodic reports for
147. See G-2 Estimate No. 24, 1:00 PM 31 Dec. to 1:00 PM 1 Jan. 1942, at 1, NARA
College Park, RG 499, Entry 128.
148. G-2 Estimate No. 26, Jan. 3, 1942, at 2, NARA College Park, RG 499, Entry 128.
149. G-2 Estimate No. 33, Jan. 14, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park, RG 499, Entry 128.
150. Id. at 3.
151. G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Jan. 31, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park, RG
499, Entry 125; G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Feb. 7, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park,
RG 499, Entry 125; G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Feb. 14, 1942, at 1, NARA College
Park, RG 499, Entry 125.
152. See G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Jan. 31, 1942, supra note 151, at 1; G-2
Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Feb. 7, 1942, supra note 151, at 1; G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00
Noon Feb. 14, 1942, supra note 151, at 1.
153. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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the interval from February 21 through March 7, G-2 predicted that
the enemy would confine itself not just to intensified attacks along the
western rim of the Pacific but also to surprise air attacks along the
West Coast.'54 But it explained that any such surprise attacks would
be "sporadic" and "undertaken as a spectacular stunt in the Axis war
of nerves to be renewed at times considered psychological by the
Japanese."' 55 By the time of the periodic report for March 14, 1942,
G-2 had again dropped surprise coastal air attacks from its list of
enemy capabilities that the Japanese were likely to pursue, though it
noted that they remained at least possible at "anytime. "156
After March 15, G-2's reports of enemy activity along the West
Coast tailed off almost entirely. Most entries were along the lines of
"[n]othing to report,' ' 157 reconnaissance with "negative results," '158 and
"marked decrease in reports of submarines [in the eastern Pacific and
Alaska] during the past week.' ' 59 Nothing in any of these G-2 reports
for March and April-or any of the preceding or following months-
indicated any imminent or even foreseeable threat of a Japanese
invasion of the West Coast or the presence of any of the manpower or
materiel that would be necessary for such an assault.
It was not simply the case that G-2 foresaw no threat of an
invasion of the mainland in the key time period of late 1941 and early
1942. In fact, G-2 did not foresee a Japanese invasion even of the
Hawaiian island of Oahu, thousands of miles closer to Japan. On
January 30, 1942, the Army's War Plans Division asked G-2 for its
"estimate of the scale of a Japanese attack which may be made on the
Hawaiian Islands within the next three to six months., 160 G-2's
Executive Officer listed the following three possibilities in reply:
a. Air and naval raids on outlying islands.
154. See G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Feb. 28, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park, RG
499, Entry 125; G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Mar. 7, 1942, at 2, NARA College Park,
RG 499, Entry 125.
155. See G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Feb. 28, 1942, supra note 154, at 4.
156. See G-2 Periodic Report, 12:00 Noon Mar. 14, 1942, at 4, NARA College Park,
RG 499, Entry 125.
157. See G-2 Estimate No. 75, Mar. 17, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park, RG 499, Entry
128; G-2 Estimate No. 80, Mar. 25, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park, RG 499, Entry 128; G-
2 Estimate No. 84, Apr. 1, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park, RG 499, Entry 128.
158. G-2 Estimate No. 76, Mar. 19, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park, RG 499, Entry
128.
159. G-2 Estimate No. 77, Mar. 21, 1942, at 1, NARA College Park, RG 499, Entry
128.
160. Letter from Colonel Ralph G. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division (Jan. 30, 1942), RG 165, WPD
General Correspondence, NARA College Park #4544-43, Box 254.
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b. Harassing air and naval raids on Oahu.
c. Combined air, naval, and ground operations to seize one of
the large undefended islands for future use as a base for an
attack on the fortress of Oahu.'61
Naturally, military planners and intelligence officials knew that
Yokohama was more than 4,200 miles distant from Seattle and more
than 4,500 miles from San Francisco, and that either voyage across
the entire Pacific would take at least eighteen days' sailing at ten
knots and fifteen days' sailing at twelve knots. 62 At a bare
operational minimum, any coastal invasion would have required
Japanese control of Hawaii, which, at 2,000 miles distant from San
Francisco, was still an eight- or nine-day sail away. Yet G-2 did not
envision the capacity for a Japanese invasion of Oahu for the three-
to six-month period starting in February of 1942.
This surely helps explain why, in the period in question, the
Pacific Coast of the continental United States was officially in "a state
of non-invasion" for the purposes of determining unity of command
between army and naval forces. Under an April 18, 1942, agreement
between Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of Naval
Operations Ernest King, Army and Navy commanders were to have
varying command hierarchies depending on whether a region was in
''a state of army-opposed invasion," "a state of fleet-opposed
invasion," or "a state of non-invasion.' ' 163 A state of army-opposed
invasion was one in which "major landing operations [were] projected
by the enemy on or near the territory of the United States"; a state of
fleet-opposed invasion was a situation in which "enemy forces in
strength have advanced or are expected to advance into the sea
areas" of the military command."6  A state of non-invasion
"indicate[d] a condition where operations of the enemy are not
projected within the [region], except by raids, submarine operations,
or sporadic attacks.' ' 65 On April 18, 1942, the day the agreement took
effect, General Marshall and Admiral King officially declared the
161. Id.
162. See Office of the Commanding Gen., W. Def. Command, Current Intelligence
Estimate and Intelligence Plan 2 (May 10, 1942), NARA College Park, RG 449, Entry 118,
Decimal 381, Box 15.
163. See CONN ET AL., supra note 49, at 43.
164. Western Sea Frontier General Order No. 1-43, Dec. 24, 1942, at 3, NARA College
Park, RG 499, Entry 118. The document is dated December 24, 1942, but because the
document itself references dates and events that came later than that, the document's date
is surely erroneous.
165. Id.
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Pacific Coast to be in a state of non-invasion,"6 and that designation
never changed throughout the war.167
Although General DeWitt at the Western Defense Command
was privy to G-2's intelligence reports and estimates of enemy
capability, he took at least a slightly more worried view of the
Japanese capacity for land-based invasion late in 1941. On December
31, 1941, through the Adjutant General of his Command, DeWitt
circulated to all commanding generals under him a memorandum
entitled "Defense of the Western Theater.""6 In describing the need
for "[d]efense against external enemies," the memorandum noted
that the only coastal attacks ranking as "probable" were "minor"
ones,169 and then ranked the three types of conceivable attacks in
decreasing order of likelihood. "[I]t is apparent," the memorandum
said, "that attacks (raids) by air or air borne troops are the most
probable." 7' "The next most probable attack," it continued, was
"from raids by enemy vessels without any attempt at landing
troops.""17 Finally, the memorandum concluded, "the least probable
attack is-by landing parties." ' But the memorandum conceded that it
was "not probable that any landing attempt w[ould] be made unless
against a worthwhile objective such as detector stations, marine oil
terminals, important factories or manufacturing plants, [or] important
utilities."'73 In places where beaches gave access to those, defense
would require "observation, ... obstacles, and limited field
fortifications." '174 But for beaches that did not give access to such
"worthwhile objectives," the memorandum noted, "observation [was]
the only protection necessary. '
To be sure, DeWitt's assessment at the end of 1941 fell far short
of predicting, or even contemplating, an outright invasion of the
continental United States; it did nothing more than list targeted
landing parties as the least probable of three sorts of "minor" attacks
that could be foreseen. Yet even this suggestion ran beyond the G-2
intelligence that might have supported it; as already noted, G-2 never
166. See id.
167. See CONN ET AL., supra note 49, at 43.
168. Letter of Command from Lieutenant Gen. DeWitt, W. Def. Command, through
Fred A. Meyer, Assistant Adjutant Gen. to Commanding Gens., W. Def. Command (Dec.
31, 1941), microformed on RG 499, Box 14 (NARA College Park).
169. Id. at 1.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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asserted that coastal attacks by Japanese landing parties were
probable, or even possible. 76 At the time of DeWitt's year-end
memorandum, G-2 saw no enemy capability beyond "surprise" air
attacks, possibly supported by naval action, and it did not think Japan
would act on that capability.177
DeWitt's maverick belief in the possibility of even a limited form
of land-based coastal attack was not lost on his superiors in
Washington, D.C., principally because he tried their patience by
asking for more and more soldiers to defend against such an attack.
Late in December, for example, DeWitt requested the assignment of
many thousands of new troops-"an additional infantry division
(triangular), or at least its three infantry regiments," as well as "a
horse-mechanized cavalry regiment." '78 The request was referred to
Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the member of the Army
general staff responsible for training and mobilization. Evaluating
DeWitt's request, McNair could not hide his impatience with
DeWitt's demands. "The Western Defense Command is being
organized to repel serious landing attacks," he observed; it already
had "six infantry divisions and a great many auxiliary units," and
"[m]ore [were] being requested almost daily."' 79 But, McNair urged,
"such a conception of the functions of this command is definitely
unsound ... under the present circumstances," because "[t]he Pacific
Coast ... seems subject to nothing more serious than air or naval
raids." 8 If the Eastern Theater were also organized on such a scale-
and, McNair noted, it would be equally "logical" to do that,
presumably because Germany posed an East Coast threat at least
equal to Japan's in the West-then "a large proportion of the troops
in [the] continental U.S. [would] be devoted to defending against very
little or nothing." 8 ' McNair was unequivocal in "recommend[ing] that
General DeWitt's request be denied," and he pressed further, urging
that Army "headquarters undertake a detailed study of the troops
required by the Western Defense Command and the Eastern
Theater," with an eye toward bringing those commands into line
"with the emphasis to which their importance entitles them. 1 82
176. See supra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
178. Letter from Lieutenant Gen. L.J. McNair, U.S. Army, to Commanding Gen.,
Field Forces (Dec. 23, 1941), microformed on RG 165, Item 4612-5, Box 259 (NARA
College Park).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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"Very little or nothing" was a far cry from the "possible Japanese
invasion which might have threatened the very integrity of our
nation' 18 3 that Justice Department lawyers trumpeted in their
Hirabayashi brief. But this was not just the idiosyncratic view of
Lieutenant General McNair; Army Chief of Staff George Marshall
adopted it as well. On December 31, 1941, Colonel Walter Smith, one
of Marshall's assistants, reported that "General Marshall approves
the ... recommendation that General DeWitt's request for an
additional division be denied and that [General Headquarters]
undertake a detailed study of the troops required by the Western
Defense Command and the Eastern Theater."'" And more
ominously for General DeWitt, Colonel Smith reported that the top
army general "consider[ed] it important that the role of the Western
Defense Command be clarified and generally understood."'85 General
Marshall, in other words, shared General McNair's view that the
Western Defense Command had no business organizing itself to repel
landing attacks that would not materialize, and needed to be retooled
to meet the true threat rather than the threat that General DeWitt
seemed to imagine.
In aid of "clarifying" the role of the Western Defense Command,
General Marshall ordered his Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier
General Mark W. Clark, to take an inspection trip to the WDC in
mid-January of 1942.186 Marshall directed Clark to focus particularly
on whether the Pacific Coast should be stripped of its designation as a
"theater of operations," whether command over troops guarding
industrial facilities should be transferred from the WDC to specific
Corps Area Commanders, and whether "mobile troops now
employed on purely defensive measures" should "gradual[ly be]
reduc[ed]."'187 In other words, Marshall was asking Clark to inspect
the WDC and advise him on whether and how significantly General
DeWitt's command should be reduced and redirected toward meeting
the West Coast's true security needs.
General Clark scrutinized the situation on the coast for five full
days and replied to the Army Chief of Staff by memorandum on
January 27, 1942. On the question of stripping the designation of
183. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 21, at 61 (emphasis added).
184. Letter from Colonel Walter B. Smith, Sec'y, U.S. Army, to Chief of Staff, Gen.
Headquarters (Dec. 31, 1941), microformed on RG 165, Item 4612-5, Box 259 (NARA
College Park).
185. Id.
186. Telegram from George C. Marshall to Commanding Officer, Barksdale Field (Jan.
18, 1942), microformed on Reel 17, Item 706 (Marshall Center Microfilm).
187. Id.
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"theater of operations" from the Western Defense Command, Clark
was unequivocally in favor: "the theater of operations, which [was]
activated on the West Coast pursuant to War Department radio of
December 11th, [should] be rescinded." 1" Clark reported that
General DeWitt was "unalterably opposed" to the idea because,
among other things, "a theater having just been created, to abolish it
so soon thereafter m[ight] have a detrimental effect upon both
military and civilian personnel on the Pacific Coast." '189 But Clark was
equally adamant. He noted that a theater of operations had a well-
established mission that included management of combat and
comprehensive control of most aspects of life in the area under the
theater commander's control. "From a tactical point of view," Clark
insisted, "all that is needed to protect the West Coast is a functional
command with the mission of defending the coastal frontier against
air and naval surface raids.""19 The command should therefore be
"relatively strong in air, antiaircraft and harbor defense forces, but
correspondingly weak in number of mobile troops." '191
General Marshall circulated Clark's recommendations to a
number of other units for comment, including the office of Provost
Marshal General Allen Gullion. In a memorandum for the Deputy
Chief of Staff on February 2, 1942, Gullion howled in protest at
Clark's suggested rescinding of the designation of the Western
Defense Command as a theater of operations. 192 The basis of
Gullion's protest was revealing, because it did not dispute Clark's
assessment that the West Coast was in danger of nothing more than
air and naval surface raids. At that moment in early February,
Gullion and his assistant Karl Bendetsen were locked in conflict with
attorneys from the Justice Department over the necessity and legality
of removing Japanese Americans from their homes along the coast;
they were gearing up to take their case to the President that he should
sign what would become Executive Order 9066.193 What frightened
Gullion about Clark's proposal was not that removing the designation
of "theater of operations" would heighten the vulnerability of the
188. Memorandum from Brigadier Gen. Mark W. Clark to Gen. George Marshall,
supra note 55, at 3.
189. Id. at 1.
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id.
192. Letter from Gen. Allen W. Gullion to Deputy Chief of Staff (Feb. 2, 1942),
microformed on Reel 50, Item 1766, at 2 (Marshall Center Microfilm).
193. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 48-58; ROBINSON, supra note 69, at 96-106
(discussing the disagreement between Attorney General Francis Biddle and Guillion
regarding removal of Japanese Americans).
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West Coast to a Japanese invasion. It was that removing that
designation would endanger the incipient program to exclude
Japanese Americans. His reasoning deserves quotation in full:
At the present time, serious consideration is being afforded the
mass evacuation of all Japanese from the West Coast, citizen
and alien alike. The Attorney General opposes this action and
states that so far as American citizens of Japanese extraction
are concerned, his Department will have nothing to do with the
proposal....
If we do not adhere to the designation "theater of operations,"
one of the bases for this action, viz., military necessity, will have
been materially weakened. To have designated the Western
Defense Command as a theater of operations upon the
outbreak of war and subsequently during the progress of the
war to have discarded that designation will strengthen the
argument of the Attorney General before the President against
mass evacuation. 194
In other words, the Western Defense Command needed to remain a
theater of operations not because Japanese ground troops might
come in, but because the Provost Marshal General did not want to
endanger the plan for kicking Japanese Americans out.1 95
In short, the archival records of the secret reports of military
intelligence and the classified debates among uniformed personnel
about the defense of the West Coast reveal no planning for-or even
discussion of-a possible Japanese invasion of the West Coast in late
1941 and early 1942. Neither, it bears emphasizing, do any of the
secret records of G-2, the War Plans Division, or Army headquarters
reveal any planning for, or even discussion of, the contingency of a
land-based invasion of the West Coast at some point in the middle or
distant future.196 One searches these records in vain for evidence that
194. Letter from Gen. Allen W. Gullion to Deputy Chief of Staff, supra note 192, at 2.
195. The War Department never acted directly on General Clark's recommendations;
his suggestions were superseded by a more comprehensive set of reorganizations of the
War Department and chains of command that unfolded over the months that followed.
See CONN ET AL., supra note 49, at 37-44. The Western Defense Command remained a
"theater of operations" until late October of 1943. See id. at 44.
196. On June 7-8, 1942, a small Japanese force invaded the lightly-defended islands of
Attu and Kiska at the very western tip of the Aleutian island chain. See PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 11, at 321. The Japanese occupation continued until the
middle of 1943, when American forces dislodged the Japanese from Attu and the Japanese
abandoned Kiska. See id. at 322. At the time of the invasion of these remote islands, U.S.
military intelligence officials were aware of the likelihood of a Japanese invasion but did
not see it as connected to any Japanese objective of invading the continental United
States. Rather, military intelligence officials understood the Japanese objectives in the
Aleutians as diverting attention from the assault on the Midway Islands, see id. at 320, and
1364 [Vol. 88
2010] HIRABAYASHI AND INVASION EVASION
the eviction of Japanese Americans from the coast was one
component of a larger contingency plan for the possibility of a coastal
invasion. Interestingly, what one does find at this time in the records
of war planners is evidence of the earliest preparations for the Allied
invasion of Normandy that would eventually occur in 1944."9
Planners were thus keenly aware of the staggering demands of
manpower, machinery, and support that it would take to launch an
invasion with a chance at success simply across the one hundred miles
of channel waters that separated England from France. It is difficult to
imagine that those conceptualizing a Normandy invasion in the spring
of 1942 could simultaneously have indulged the idea that the
Japanese planned to invade California, Oregon, or Washington, or
that the immediate exclusion of Japanese Americans was necessary to
prepare against such an invasion.
These reports and debates were all secret and classified. But that
does not mean that the truth about the external threat to the West
Coast was a secret that the military held tight within itself. The
opposite is true: military officials briefed members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate about the external threat during the
key time period, and candidly told them that the coast was not in
danger of invasion.
One of the officials who testified to this effect was none other
than General Mark W. Clark, just days after he returned from his
January 1942 inspection tour of the Western Defense Command. The
occasion was a February 3 meeting of an informal House-Senate
Committee on Defense of the West Coast that California Senator
Hiram Johnson had appointed a day earlier at a meeting of the House
and Senate delegations of the coastal states.'98 Chaired by Senator
Rufus Holman of Oregon, this committee's charge was "to consider
immediate plans for an impregnable defense of the Pacific coast,'199
protecting the flank of an assault on Siberia to eliminate the menace of Russian air power.
See Office of the Commanding Gen., W. Def. Command & Fourth Army, Current
Intelligence Estimate & Intelligence Plan 13 (May 10, 1942), RG 499, Entry 118, Box 15
(NARA College Park).
197. See Memorandum from the Chief of Staff to the President (1942), microformed on
Reel 116, Item 2696 (Marshall Center Microfilm).
198. See H.R. 1911, 77th Cong. 3 (2d Sess. 1942). The committee consisted of Senators
Rufus Holman, Charles McNary, and Homer Bone, and Representatives John Tolan,
Edward Izac, Albert Carter, Harry Englebright, Frank Buck, Carl Hinshaw, Charles
Kramer, and Ward Johnson of California, Martin Smith, Charles Leavy, and Henry
Jackson of Washington, James Mott of Oregon, and Anthony Dimond of Alaska. See
Letter from Senator Hiram W. Johnson to Senator Rufus C. Holman (Feb. 3, 1942),
microformed on Reel 10, frame 443 (NARA).
199. See H.R. 1911, at 2.
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and its first action was to ask Army Chief of Staff George Marshall
and Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark to appear before it and
explain the threat to the West Coast and the preparedness of the
military to meet it.2"' Admiral Stark attended in person; Marshall sent
his deputy, General Clark.2"1
Testimony at the February 3 meeting was not recorded because
of the need for confidentiality, but the substance of Stark's and
Clark's comments survives in notes taken by Senator Homer T. Bone
of Washington and in a letter written by the committee's chairman,
Senator Holman, to Senator Hiram Johnson. According to Senator
Bone, writing the day after the meeting, both Clark and Stark told the
gathered Senators and Representatives that "an invasion effort was
out of the question" and "was not expected by the military or naval
administration. '"202 "The most the enemy could hope to do," the
military officials stated, "would be to possibly have a submarine
throw a few shells into some city which would be a futile operation
from the standpoint of practical results.""2 3 They conceded that "it
was also remotely possible that what amounts to a 'landing party' of a
handful of men might attempt a pure 'suicide operation' on the beach
somewhere but they would be mopped up before they would be able
to reach any objective worthy of mention."2" Senator Holman's
letter, drafted six days after the meeting, was consistent with Bone's
notes. "Admiral Stark expressed the opinion that it would be
impossible for the enemy to engage in a sustained attack on the
Pacific Coast at the present time,"2 5 Holman wrote. Holman's
recollection was that Stark had described "sporadic raids" as
"possible, and perhaps even probable," but Stark had also
"emphasized ... that such raids would be sporadic and would have
little, if any, bearing on the course of the war.""
200. See Letter from Senator Hiram W. Johnson to Senator Rufus C. Holman, supra
note 198.
201. See Memorandum from H.T.B. 1 (Feb. 4, 1942), microformed on Records of the
Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study [hereinafter JERS], Reel 4, frame 277b
(Bancroft Library).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Letter from Senator Rufus C. Holman to Senator Hiram W. Johnson 1 (Feb. 9,
1942), microformed on JERS, Reel 4, frame 283b-284a (Bancroft Library).
206. Id. at 1-2. To much the same effect was a letter from Rufus Holman to Navy
Secretary Frank Knox on February 27, 1942, in which Holman complained about rumored
plans to shift some of the operations of West Coast industries inland as a protective
measure. "If we have a Navy in the Pacific and if we have any reasonable quantity of
airplanes available for offensive or defensive purposes," Holman wrote, "it seems clear to
us as laymen that the only likelihood of air attack from the Japanese will be a possible
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What is most striking about this congressional testimony from
Admiral Stark and especially from General Clark, who had just
completed an inspection of the Western Defense Command and was
privately urging its termination as a theater of operations, is its
consistency with the intelligence data of the time. The opinion that G-
2 was reporting to the War Department's top brass in the early
months of 1942 was that sporadic harassing air- and naval-supported
raids on the Pacific Coast were possible, but G-2 foresaw no risk of a
Japanese invasion.2 °7 This is precisely what Clark and Stark shared
with Senator Holman's committee; they neither overdramatized nor
underplayed the external threat to the West Coast as the military
knew it. It was therefore not just a strict military secret in the late
winter of 1942 that the West Coast faced nothing like the threat of
invasion that the government's Hirabayashi submissions would later
emphasize. Members of Congress knew this as well.
There is only one place in the historical record of the time where
a top government official mused about a threat of a Japanese invasion
of the West Coast, but it was not in an official document. It was,
rather, in a private diary-that of Secretary of War Henry Stimson.
The seventy-four-year-old Cabinet member wrote the following in his
entry for February 10, 1942, a day when he had spent time with his
top deputy John J. McCloy going over maps of the West Coast that
showed the areas from which General DeWitt wanted the Japanese
excluded:
[The dangers posed by Americans citizens of Japanese
ancestry] are a terrific problem, particularly as I think it is quite
within the bounds of possibility that if the Japanese should get
naval dominance in the Pacific they would try an invasion of this
country; and if they did, we would have a tough job meeting
them. The people of the United States have made an enormous
mistake in underestimating the Japanese. They are now
beginning to learn their mistake. Many times during recent
months I have recalled meeting Homer Lea when I was
Secretary of War under Mr. Taft. He was a little humpback
man who wrote a book on the Japanese peril entitled "The
occasional token bomb by some small aircraft carrier bent on a suicide mission," which
"could not be other than a minor menace to our industries, in its worst aspect." Letter
from Senator Rufus C. Holman to Frank Knox, Sec'y of the Navy (Feb. 27, 1942),
microformed on CWRIC Papers, Reel 10, frame 448 (NARA).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 149-59.
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Valor of Ignorance". In those days the book seemed fantastic.
Now the things which he prophesied seem quite possible.2 °8
What Homer Lea had "prophesied" in The Valor of Ignorance was an
all-out Japanese onslaught on California, Oregon, and Washington-
an invasion by hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops that,
because of Japanese might and American unpreparedness, would net
the invaders first the Pacific Northwest, then Los Angeles and
Southern California, and finally San Francisco and northern
California.2"9 With the western states captured, Japan would set up an
impenetrable defensive barrier along the mountains to the east of the
captured territory; American forces would not only fail to reclaim its
conquered western flank but would tumble into internal disarray,
with the result that "this heterogeneous Republic, in its principles,
shall disintegrate, and again into the palm of re-established monarchy
pay the toll of its vanity and its scorn. 210
The fears of a Japanese invasion that Henry Stimson voiced to
himself in his diary on February 10 were at odds with every piece of
military intelligence flowing through the department he headed. To
be sure, Stimson premised his fears on the counterfactual assumption
of Japanese naval dominance in the Pacific Ocean; that assumption
took his musings out of direct conflict with the contemporaneous
views and plans of the Army's Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Army's G-2 division, and the War Plans Division. But
the source of Stimson's worries-Homer Lea's panicked image of an
invading Yellow Peril leaving "[tihe towns along the seaboard of the
Pacific coast ... destroyed and the American flag ... no longer ...
loitering over the wide waters of this sea",211-provides us with at least
a hint of one thing that might have led government lawyers to regale
the Supreme Court in Hirabayashi with a scary story of plans to meet
a threatened invasion that did not exist.
IV. WHAT THE LAWYERS KNEW, AND WHEN THEY KNEW IT
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the only official
government documents of the World War II era in which anyone
expressed a worry about an invasion of the West Coast in late 1941
and early 1942 were the government's submissions to the Supreme
Court in the Hirabayashi case, where, as noted earlier, lawyers
208. Diary of Henry L. Stimson (Feb. 10, 1942), microformed on CWRIC Papers, Reel
17, frame 202 (NARA) (emphasis added).
209. See HOMER LEA, THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE 256-308 (1909).
210. Id. at 308.
211. Id. at 36.
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elevated a Japanese invasion to the central threat facing that region.2 2
At first glance, this might seem an entirely innocent, or at least
excusable, deviation from military reality. Justice Department lawyers
were naturally not on the distribution list for G-2's intelligence
reports on enemy capabilities, just as they were not party to the
internal debates on General Clark's proposal that the Western
Defense Command be stripped of its designation as a theater of
operations to bring it into alignment with the rather modest external
threat of sporadic air raids that the coast actually faced. Moreover, as
noted earlier, Justice Department lawyers adopted a strategy of
asking the Supreme Court to take judicial notice of the security
situation on the West Coast.213 This allowed the lawyers to build their
account of the external risk to the coast by citing newspaper articles
and other allegations in the public domain rather than military
documents.
But the possibility of wholly unwitting attorney error is shattered
by other important archival documents. These records reveal that the
lawyers who drafted the submissions in Hirabayashi were on notice
that the military was not in fact anticipating, or even envisioning, a
Japanese invasion. While the lawyers were not privy to the raw
intelligence data, they did learn the conclusions that top military
officials drew from that data. And they knew that those conclusions
were far less dire than the emergency they depicted in their
Hirabayashi submissions.
As noted earlier, Admiral Stark and General Clark told the ad
hoc House-Senate Committee on Defense of the West Coast that "an
invasion effort was out of the question '214 on February 3, 1942. Two
days later, several Justice Department officials appeared before a
different ad hoc House-Senate Committee made up of members of
the West Coast congressional delegations; this committee's charge
was to investigate "question[s] of enemy alien and sabotage control"
along the West Coast.215 Appearing for the Justice Department were
Attorney General Francis Biddle, Assistant Attorney General James
Rowe, Justice Department attorney Philip Burling, and Assistant
Attorney General Edward Ennis, the director of the Justice
Department's Enemy Alien Control Unit.216 (Ennis and Burling
212. In referring to "official" documents, I do not here include Henry Stimson's private
diary. See supra text accompanying note 208.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
214. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
215. See H.R. 1911, 77th Cong. 2 (2d Sess. 1942).
216. See Notes of the Meeting of the Committee on Alien Enemies and Sabotage 5
(Feb. 5, 1942), microformed on JERS, Reel 4, frame 281b (NARA).
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would both sign the government's brief in Hirabayashi in May of
1943.)17 Here the lawyers got their first glimpse of the true coastal
threat that the military understood the country to be facing. The
Attorney General emphasized to the committee that while the Justice
Department had been quick to take action against Japanese aliens in
the "prohibited areas" that the military had thus far designated, the
evacuation of United States citizens was a different matter: "[i]f there
[was] to be wholesale evacuation[,]" the surviving notes of the
meeting have the Attorney General saying, "such a tremendous job
must devolve on the Army," which "must determine the risk and
undertake the responsibility for evacuating citizens of Japanese
descent." '218 Republican Congressman Richard Welch of California
then "pointed out that he had asked the Army and Navy if there was
any possibility of a raid on the West Coast and ... they had replied
negatively .... "219
It is important not to make too much of this statement by
Congressman Welch to the Attorney General. We cannot be sure that
it was recorded with precision by the anonymous note-taker at the
committee hearing, and there is reason to suspect that it may not have
been, since Admiral Stark and General Clark had told the other joint
House-Senate committee two days earlier that the military did
anticipate Japanese "raids," but not an invasion.22° In addition,
Congressman Welch appears to have cited this military conclusion
skeptically, since he went on to note that "the Army had moved the
headquarters of the 9th Corps Area from the Presidio in San
Francisco to Salt Lake City," '221 an odd thing to do if the military was
not expecting Japanese "raids." Finally, what Welch was relating was
hearsay. Still, his statement to the Attorney General, in the presence
of Ennis and Burling, at least suggests that those lawyers knew as
early as February of 1942 that the military was not anticipating a
Japanese invasion of the West Coast.
Evidence from the fall of 1942, however, makes this much
clearer. Late in September, a young graduate student named Morton
Grodzins travelled to Washington, D.C., from the University of
California at Berkeley to gather data for the Japanese Evacuation
and Resettlement Study ("JERS"), a research project that was
217. See Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 21, at 82.
218. Notes of the Meeting of the Committee on Alien Enemies and Sabotage, supra
note 216, at 5.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
221. Notes of the Meeting of the Committee on Alien Enemies and Sabotage, supra
note 216, at 5.
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examining the genesis of the program to exclude Japanese Americans
from the coast.222 During this trip, Grodzins managed to obtain
extraordinary access to many top legislative and executive branch
officials, including influential members of the House and Senate and
top lawyers at the Justice Department. Grodzins's working hypothesis
was that political pressure played a far greater explanatory role in the
creation of the exclusion policy than was then generally understood.
In response to Grodzins's requests, most members of the West Coast
congressional delegations allowed the graduate student to examine,
catalogue, and even copy their files from the period in the late winter
of 1942-then just eight months or so earlier-when the Japanese
American policy had been set. The records they supplied included the
correspondence they had received from individual constituents and
lobbying groups as well as the minutes and memoranda of the several
formal and informal congressional committees that had formed in
February of 1942 to examine the adequacy of coastal defenses and the
risks of Japanese American sabotage and espionage. 23 At the same
time, Grodzins was having lengthy discussions with Justice
Department lawyers, including Edward Ennis of the Alien Enemy
Control Unit, and profiting from astonishing access to Justice
Department records.
By October 10, 1942, Grodzins had had the chance to review and
copy the records of Senator Hiram Johnson of California, who very
early in February had convened the two ad-hoc House-Senate
committees on coastal defense and on espionage and sabotage, as
well as the records of Senator Rufus Holman of Oregon, the chair of
the coastal defense committee, and Mon Wallgren of Washington,
who had chaired the committee on espionage and sabotage. The
records that Grodzins gathered included Senator Homer T. Bone's
notes of the February 3 meeting of Senator Holman's committee
indicating that General Mark Clark and Admiral Harold Stark had
deemed a Japanese invasion "out of the question. ' 224 They also
included Senator Holman's February 9 letter to Senator Johnson
relating that Admiral Stark had described a "sustained attack" on the
coast as "impossible" when he spoke to the coastal defense
committee and had instead reported that the military envisioned only
222. A good source on the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study is VIEWS
FROM WITHIN: THE JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT STUDY
(Yuji Ichioka ed., 1989).
223. Some of these materials are preserved in the records of the Japanese Evacuation
and Resettlement Study. See, e.g., JERS, Reel 4, frames 277b-284a (Bancroft Library).
224. Memorandum from H.T.B., supra note 201, at 1.
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"sporadic raids" with "little, if any, bearing on the course of the
war. "225
On October 10, Grodzins sat down for a session with Edward
Ennis of the Justice Department.2 6 Sadly, Grodzins's notes of that
interview do not survive, but several days later, while writing notes of
meetings on October 13 with legislators, Grodzins dashed off a note
to himself-presumably a reminder of an important exchange from
his October 10 conversation with Ennis that he had neglected to write
down earlier.227 This is what Grodzins wrote:
Note on talk to Ennis, Oct. 10: I asked Ennis about the
congressional response to the testimony of Admiral Stark to the
effect that the West Coast could not be successfully attacked in
force: "The congressmen simply told the Navy representative to
go to hell and that he Stark didn't know what he was talking
about. They pointed out the errors at Pearl Harbor and said
that they refused to accept his professional advice. Their
attitude was 'we know better: we refuse to have another Pearl
Harbor in Los Angeles.' "228
This is a very important jotting. At a bare minimum, it
demonstrates that by October 10, 1942-many months before the
drafting and filing of the government's brief in Hirabayashi-Edward
Ennis knew that the Chief of Naval Operations had told legislators in
early February of 1942 that Japan could not attack the West Coast in
force. But it is also quite likely that Ennis knew even more than this
about those early February discussions in the congressional
committee. We know that Grodzins had already obtained copies of
notes and memoranda about those discussions, and while we cannot
be certain that Grodzins shared those with Ennis that day, we do
know that he had a strong and cooperative relationship with the
Justice Department lawyers and that he shared his findings with them
on other occasions. More importantly, though, it is crucial to note the
precise question that Grodzins asked Ennis and the precise answer
that Ennis gave. Grodzins did not ask Ennis whether he knew what
Admiral Stark had said to the congressmen about the external threat
to the coast; he asked Ennis what the congressmen's response to that
225. Letter from Senator Rufus Holman to Senator Hiram W! Johnson, supra note 205,
at 1-2.
226. See Handwritten Note, JERS, Reel 10, frame 385; GRODZINS IN WASHINGTON
REPORT #13, at 4-5, (Oct. 12, 1942), CWRIC Papers, Reel 10, frames 394-95 (Bancroft
Library).
227. See Letter from Senator Rufus Holman to Senator Hiram W. Johnson, supra note
205, at 1.
228. Id. The word "he" is lined out in the original, and "Stark" is added in handwriting.
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testimony had been. And Ennis answered fully, telling the researcher
that the congressmen had dismissed the military's views. Clearly,
then, Ennis already knew what had transpired before the House-
Senate committee on February 3; he did not learn it from Grodzins.
He knew that two of the highest-ranking officers in the Army and
Navy reported the military's assessment at that time that the Japanese
could not manage an assault on the West Coast larger than mere
raids. The historical record does not allow us to know exactly when
Edward Ennis learned this, though one reasonable possibility is that
he learned it just two days after it happened, on February 5, 1942,
when Ennis himself went to Capitol Hill along with the Attorney
General and Philip Burling to testify to members of those same West
Coast delegations about the dangers of sabotage and espionage.
The precise date is not important, however. What matters is that
Edward Ennis knew all of this long before the Hirabayashi case even
reached the Supreme Court. This evidence reveals that when Ennis
and Burling signed a brief contending that the "principal danger to be
apprehended was a Japanese invasion, "229 Ennis (and probably
Burling) had reason to know that the military was not planning to
meet a Japanese invasion. They urged the Court to take judicial
notice of a military "fact" that they knew top military officials had
told Congress was not a fact.23°
V. DID THE LAWYERS LIE?
It would be easy at this point to charge the Justice Department
lawyers with lying to the Supreme Court in Hirabayashi about the
threat of a Japanese invasion. This Article has marshaled
circumstantial evidence that their "judicial notice" strategy allowed
them to depict as true something they knew to be false. That certainly
sounds like a lie.
229. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 21, at 65.
230. It is a shame that the notes of Morton Grodzins's October 10 meeting with Ennis
have been lost, because Grodzins eventually claimed that at that meeting, Ennis drew an
explicit connection between the testimony of Stark and Clark to the Wallgren committee
and the foundation of the mass exclusion program. In Americans Betrayed, Grodzins
writes that "Edward Ennis ... pointed out that this testimony destroyed one of the main
arguments for mass evacuation of Japanese citizens and aliens, i.e., that an organized fifth
column could spring up at the point of an enemy attack." GRODZINS, supra note 69, at 74.
Grodzins here cites to his now-lost field notes of his October 10 meeting, so it is
impossible to know whether these words were Grodzins's or Ennis's. If they were Ennis's,
that would show even more clearly Ennis's awareness of the gap between what he knew
military officials said about the external threat in early 1942 and what appeared in the
Hirabayashi brief.
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There is, however, reason to pause before leveling such a charge
at these lawyers, and it goes beyond the general hesitation that ought
to accompany any charge of willful deception by a lawyer. The reason
is that the literature has given us a very different narrative about
Edward Ennis and his work on matters involving Japanese Americans
in World War II. In this narrative, he was something much closer to a
hero than a villain. We know that in early February of 1942, Ennis
opposed the military's plan for mass exclusion and fought to prevent
it. At the conclusion of the meeting in which he lost that fight, he had
been so angry that he had "almost wept" on the taxi ride back to his
office and had to be "convince[d] ... that it was not important
enough to make him quit his job." '231
In addition, as Peter Irons explains in Justice at War, the
definitive account of the Supreme Court litigation, in 1943 and 1944
Ennis came into possession of materials that undermined the
accuracy of the military's negative assessments of the loyalties of
Japanese Americans, and pressed Charles Fahy, the Solicitor
General, to bring the government's submissions into line with those
materials.232 Ennis pressed only mildly in the Hirabayashi litigation,
because the material he then had at hand, reports of the opinion of a
naval intelligence officer on Japanese Americans' loyalties that was
more sanguine than the military had thus far provided, was in tension
with the tone of the Hirabayashi brief but did not flatly contradict
it.233 He and Burling objected far more loudly in the Korematsu
litigation in 1944 when they battled to prevent the Solicitor General
from relying on allegations of subversive activity by Japanese
Americans in a self-serving report by General DeWitt that the
lawyers knew to be inaccurate.234 They went so far as to threaten not
to sign the Korematsu brief because of its tendency to mislead the
Court on the degree of internal risk that Japanese Americans
posed,235 and ultimately signed a modified version of that brief only
out of institutional loyalty. 236 In later years, Ennis-who served for
many years after the war as the general counsel to the American Civil
Liberties Union237-expressed regret that he and Burling had not
231. IRONS, supra note 15, at 62 (quoting Ennis's Justice Department colleague James
Rowe).
232. See id. at 278-93.
233. See id. at 202-06.
234. See id. at 278-92.
235. See id. at 290.
236. See id. at 292.
237. See id. at 349.
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resigned in protest rather than continuing to work on the defense of
the Japanese American cases.238
Ennis thus proved himself to be sensitive to the illegality of the
military's treatment of citizens and to its misrepresentations on the
question of internal security risks. The literature depicts him as
neither an unscrupulous man nor an unethical lawyer; indeed, within
the wartime Justice Department, he emerges as perhaps the most
ethically attuned member of the staff. Yet in May of 1943, he signed
his name to the government's brief in Hirabayashi, with information
at hand that contradicted the brief's fear-mongering about a Japanese
invasion of the West Coast. How can we explain this paradox?
One possibility is that Ennis did not feel he had a firm enough
foundation to complain about the inaccuracy of the Hirabayashi
brief's assertions about a Japanese invasion. As noted earlier, neither
Ennis nor any other Justice Department lawyer was party to the raw
military intelligence reports or to the internal military memoranda
that revealed the absence of planning for, or discussion of, a Japanese
invasion. The historical record proves only that Grodzins told Edward
Ennis in the fall of 1942 that top military officials had asserted to
Congress that the country faced no invasionary threat. The record
suggests, but does not prove, that Ennis received copies of
congressional memoranda confirming those assertions from Grodzins
at that time, and that Ennis and Burling may also have heard of them
from a congressional source all the way back in February of 1942. In
the later debates about the Korematsu brief, Ennis had more concrete
proof of the brief's inaccuracies, in the form of paper copies of
versions of General DeWitt's final report and documents from both
the FBI and the Federal Communications Commission.239 Thus, it is
possible that the lawyers felt that however inconsistent with reality
the Hirabayashi brief's "judicial notice" theory was on the question of
a Japanese invasion, their evidence of that inconsistency was not
concrete enough to take up the chain of Justice Department
command.
This, however, seems unlikely. Edward Ennis did complain to
Solicitor General Charles Fahy during the preparation of the
Hirabayashi brief about potential misrepresentations on a different
matter, and did so on the strength of data he acknowledged to be less
than concrete. In October of 1942, Harper's Magazine published an
anonymous report by "An Intelligence Officer" asserting that only a
238. See id. at 350-51.
239. See id. at 278-302.
1375
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
subset of Japanese Americans posed a security threat in early 1942,
and that it would have been possible for the military to identify that
sub-group rather than excluding the group en masse.24° Shortly before
the Solicitor General's Office filed the brief, Ennis learned that the
anonymous author of the Harper's article was Kenneth Ringle, an
official in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and that Ringle had said
similar things in a memorandum he had prepared for the War
Relocation Authority. 241 These allegations were in tension with the
then-circulating draft of the Hirabayashi brief, which maintained that
individual screening had not been feasible. Ennis took the initiative to
bring these inconsistencies to the attention of the Solicitor General,
saying that the brief's failure to mention Ringle's WRA
memorandum "might approximate the suppression of evidence. 242
Ennis was comfortable making this charge because, he explained to
Fahy, he had been "most informally, but altogether reliably, advised
that both the article and the WRA memorandum prepared by Ringle
represent the views, if not of the Navy, at least of those Naval
intelligence officers in charge of Japanese counter-intelligence
work., 243 If Ennis was comfortable going to Fahy when only
informally made aware of this military opinion contradicting the brief,
it is hard to understand why he would have refrained from
mentioning the inconsistency on the threat of invasion for fear that
his evidence of the military's view was insufficiently formal and
concrete.
There is, however, another possibility, one that reconciles the
lawyers' complicity in misrepresenting the external threat with their
vigilance against misrepresenting the internal threat. It may be that
Edward Ennis never really came to sense an inconsistency between
the Hirabayashi brief and the military reality on the question of a
Japanese invasion. The objective inconsistency between those things
may never have entered his subjective awareness; he may have
continued to believe that military officials in early 1942 were
preparing to meet a Japanese invasion even after learning that top
army and navy officials had told Congress otherwise. This theory has
two components, one of them documentable and one speculative.
240. See An Intelligence Officer, The Japanese in America: The Problem and a
Solution, HARPER'S, Oct. 1942, at 489,490-93.
241. See IRONS, supra note 15, at 202-03.
242. See id., at 204 (quoting Memorandum from Edward Ennis, Director, Alien Enemy
Control Unit, Justice Department, to Charles Fahy, Solicitor General (Apr. 30, 1943)).
243. See id. at 202 (emphasis added) (quoting Memorandum from Edward Ennis,
Director, Alien Enemy Control Unit, Justice Department, to Charles Fahy, Solicitor
General (Apr. 30, 1943)).
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What is documentable is that however vigilant Edward Ennis
may have been for military caricatures of Japanese Americans, he
had little trouble standing up in court in defense of exceedingly broad
claims of military power and necessity. Even though he acknowledged
in an August 1944 memorandum that military witnesses at trial
tended to "go beyond and not correctly reflect the military
judgment"'  of top Army and War Department officials, he willingly
called those witnesses to defend both the military's continued use of
martial law in Hawaii as late as April of 194445 and the military's
program of individually excluding certain Japanese Americans from
returning to the West Coast as late as February of 1945.246 In both
cases, Ennis elicited testimony about the supposed continuing (or
even escalating) peril facing Hawaii and the West Coast at those late
points in the war that strained belief to the breaking point.2 47 He did
this to support and defend the broadest of military claims of
unfettered power over civilians on U.S. territory. Thus, while Ennis
may have internally protested the coarsest of the military's racial
caricatures of Japanese Americans, he proved himself quite receptive
to some of the military's wildest and most self-serving accounts of
national security and threats to the coast.
This credulous stance is apparent in the writings of another of
the Hirabayashi brief's authors, Justice Department attorney Nanette
Dembitz. It was Dembitz who had advocated for reliance on the
"judicial notice" doctrine in depicting the invasionary threat facing
the West Coast.248 It was also Dembitz who, within months of the
Court's Korematsu decision, published a law review article sharply
criticizing the Court for accepting, rather than testing, the very
244. ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE
AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II 114 (2007) (quoting Memorandum from
Edward J. Ennis, Dir., Alien Enemy Control Unit, Justice Dep't, to John L. Burling, Alien
Control Unit (Aug. 14, 1944) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) which quotes
Memorandum from Edward J. Ennis, Dir., Alien Enemy Control Unit, Justice Dep't, to
John L. Burling, Alien Control Unit (Apr. 14, 1944) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review)).
245. See ROBINSON, supra note 67, at 235-36.
246. See MULLER, supra note 244, at 124-30.
247. In the Hawaii case, Ennis called Army and Navy officials to testify that in April of
1944, Hawaii remained "vulnerable to invasion, with its safety dependent on military
judgment." ROBINSON, supra note 67, at 235. Cross-examination devastated these claims.
See id. at 236. In the West Coast case on individual exclusion in early 1945, Ennis elicited
testimony that because of their "banzai" and "face-saving attitude[s]," the Japanese were
likelier to assault the West Coast as their military fortunes collapsed than they had been
earlier in the war. See MULLER, supra note 244, at 126.
248. See Memorandum from Nanette Dembitz, Attorney, War Dep't to John L.
Burling, Attorney, War Dep't, supra note 91, at 17-18.
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military judgments imposing racial burdens that she had helped to
defend.249 The article was, in a sense, Dembitz's awkward and thinly
veiled apologia for her own role in advocating for the mistaken
conclusions that the Court had reached, but interestingly, she saw no
error in having urged the Court to assume the serious threat of
coastal invasion that military leaders had told Congress did not exist.
Instead, in the otherwise at least implicitly contrite article, Dembitz
defended that invocation of judicial notice: she wrote that "[t]he only
circumstance as to which the military would have had information
which could not be disclosed-the danger of invasion-was the one
fact on which there was also ample public knowledge .".. "250 Like her
colleague Edward Ennis, Dembitz seemed to remain willing to
believe the worst case scenario for the West Coast's exposure to
Japanese invasion, even as she faulted the military for tendering other
distortions and the Court for unquestioningly accepting them.
Thus, it is possible to document a sort of blind spot in the vision
of the government lawyers litigating Hirabayashi, a proclivity to
credit and defend the direst of depictions of external threats to
national security and territorial integrity. But we might speculate that
this blind spot was especially profound in Hirabayashi because the
supposedly grave invasionary threat to the coast was a Japanese
threat. We saw earlier that Secretary of War Henry Stimson allowed
himself to muse in his private diary about the possibility of a land-
based Japanese invasion in February of 1942, even while all of the
data and planning in his department ran in the opposite direction.2
The touchstone of Stimson's fears was Homer Lea's The Valor of
Ignorance, a small and hysterical volume published in 1909 that
predicted a successful Japanese invasion of California, Oregon, and
Washington.252 Stimson's diary entry did not reflect an idiosyncratic
fear; it reflected a ubiquitous characterization of the Japanese (and of
Asians generally) that dominated the public culture of the first third
of the twentieth century. In modern terms, it was one important
component of the racial schema 253 of the "Oriental" that stalked the
American mind.
Traveling through China in the late nineteenth century, Rudyard
Kipling was moved to observe that while "[t]here are three races who
can work," the Chinese were the only race that could "swarm"; they
249. See Dembitz, supra note 91, at 224-39.
250. Id. at 206.
251. See supra notes 208-211 and accompanying text.
252. See LEA, supra note 209, passim.
253. See Kang, supra note 17, at 956-57.
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would "work and spread" and eventually "overwhelm the world." 4
This was an English-language elaboration on the idea of the "gelbe
Gefahr," or "Yellow Peril," that Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany
envisioned threatening all of Europe in 1895.255 The idea of the
"Yellow Peril" cast people from Asian countries in many of the same
ways as the ideology of the day depicted all non-white "others":
incapable of assimilation, impoverished, vile, and terrifyingly fecund.
But it added the distinctive feature that Kipling called "swarming": as
Roger Daniels notes, "[o]nly against Orientals was it seriously
charged that ... peaceful immigrants were but a vanguard of an
invading horde to come. 256
From our early-twenty-first-century American vantage point, it is
difficult for us to reconstruct, let alone understand, the racial
essentialism that animated the Yellow Peril idea and allowed it to
root itself so firmly in the national consciousness. But this was the
heyday of the American fascination with the "science" of racial
eugenics and its insistence that attributes of personality and
tendencies of behavior were racially determined and passed on from
generation to generation through the genes. 257 Thinkers in the
American mainstream-Brooks Adams, the grandson and great-
grandson of American presidents, was one-saw the "white race" in
inevitable conflict with the "yellow," and lesser, race of the East.258
Adams, writing around the turn of the century, saw the principal
danger as an alliance of the Chinese and the Russians; Homer Lea,
writing at the end of the twentieth century's first decade, located the
threat in Japan. But one thing that united the various Yellow Peril
thinkers was the belief that the fertile Asian peoples posed a
population threat to the white or Nordic peoples. 259 Their eastern
territory could not contain them; they would seek to spread to lands
under white control.
Of course, these were among the views that led American policy
to slow and then stop Asian immigration into the United States in the
254. RUDYARD KIPLING, FROM SEA TO SEA 255-56 (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday
McClure & Co. 1899).
255. See Stanford M. Lyman, The "Yellow Peril" Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of
a Racist Discourse, 13 INT'L J. POL. CULTURE & SoC. 683, 689 (2000); RICHARD AUSTIN
THOMPSON, THE YELLOW PERIL, 1890-1924, at 1-2 (1978).
256. ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 68 (1962).
257. See ELOF AXEL CARLSON, THE UNFIT: A HISTORY OF A BAD IDEA 183-98
(2001).
258. See THOMPSON, supra note 255, at 21-31.
259. See id. at 63-90.
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first quarter of the twentieth century.26° But it is important to note
that the Yellow Peril ideology of that era focused not just on the
peaceful arrival of immigrants; it led people to dread a forcible
military invasion of American territory. The Hearst newspapers gave
voice to this terror as early as December of 1906, when the San
Francisco Examiner ran a front-page story with the headline "Japan
Sounds Our Coasts," claiming that "Brown Men Have Maps and
Could Land Easily. '261 Admiral (and Congressman) Richmond
Pearson Hobson sounded a more detailed warning in 1907 in a two-
part Hearst series that ran under the headline "Japan May Seize the
Pacific Slope. 2 62 H.G. Wells imagined a combined Japanese-Chinese
assault on the West Coast in his popular 1908 novel The War in the
Air.263 As noted earlier, Homer Lea charted out the specifics of a
three-pronged Japanese invasion of the West Coast in his 1909 work
The Valor of Ignorance, which would conveniently be reprinted in a
new edition in 1942 just after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.2"
Perhaps the most graphic of the peddlers of the invasion story was
Lothrop Stoddard, "a founding father of the American eugenics
movement, ' 265 who presented an invasion of the West Coast as one
component of what Robert Lee has aptly called a "racial
apocalypse '' 21 in which, as Stoddard put it, "[t]he White race and with
it a million years of human evolution might soon be irretrievably lost,
swamped by the triumphant colored races. '267 The title of Stoddard's
leading work aptly captured the imagery of the Yellow Peril's central
fear; he called his book The Rising Tide of Color Against White
World-Supremacy. The Japanese were a tidal force, a wave breaking
over the dikes protecting white dominance of the North American
continent.26
There is no reason to think that Edward Ennis or the other
Hirabayashi brief writers consciously entertained the rabid depictions
260. See Keith Aoki, "Foreign-ness" & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World
War 11 Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 34 (1996).
261. DANIELS, supra note 256, at 70.
262. Id. at 71.
263. H.G. WELLS, THE WAR IN THE AIR passim (1908).
264. See HOMER LEA, THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE (2d ed. 1942) passim.
265. ROBERT G. LEE, ORIENTALS: ASIAN AMERICANS IN POPULAR CULTURE 136
(1999).
266. Id.
267. LoTHROP STODDARD, THE RISING TIDE OF COLOR AGAINST WHITE WORLD-
SUPREMACY 20 (1920).
268. See id. at 225-98. Lyman's explication of the "Yellow Peril" characterization of
the Japanese in The "Yellow Peril" Mystique is also thorough and excellent. Lyman, supra
note 255, at 698-710.
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of the Asian horde that marked the Yellow Peril era, although recent
scholarship suggests that Ennis was not immune to racial assumptions
about Japanese Americans. 269 But this account of the early-century
zeitgeist is what makes Henry Stimson's February 1942 diary entry so
revealing of a turn of thought that may still have been common
before Pearl Harbor and that the Japanese attack surely revived.
Stimson had access to all of the military's data and reporting. None of
it foresaw or counseled preparation for a Japanese invasion of the
coast. Nonetheless, Stimson's mind wandered to the thirty-plus-year-
old, Yellow-Peril-inflected predictions of Homer Lea; suddenly they
did not seem to him so fantastical. This is powerful, and unusually
direct, evidence of the operation of a racial schema: the uncertainties
of the day led Stimson's mind past what he knew to something he had
long latently feared, a Japanese invading horde. At least in this
private moment of journaling, the schema of the Japanese as an
invading racial enemy fought with the facts for primacy in Stimson's
mind.
Might this phenomenon have had a broader life than this one
brief moment in Henry Stimson's diary? There is no way to know
this; we can only speculate. 270 But if it did, it suggests a way to
reconcile the otherwise baffling inconsistency in the wartime
lawyering on the Hirabayashi case. On this view, the lawyers may
have been sufficiently aware of certain aspects of the Japanese racial
schema to spot them when they surfaced in the military's depiction of
the internal risks that Japanese Americans posed. And this speculated
awareness led them to fight against the inclusion in the government's
brief of facts and arguments that crassly played on the component of
the schema that depicted American citizens of Japanese ancestry as
racially inscrutable, untrustworthy, and given to subversive and
disloyal behavior. But the component of the racial schema that drew
Japan as a force bent on territorial invasion may have been too strong
in their minds. It may have run too deep and subverted full awareness
of the facts they had at hand. It may have led them, after learning that
top military officials were neither expecting nor preparing for
invasion, to sign a brief depicting the military as "[f]aced with the
responsibility of repelling a possible Japanese invasion which might
have threatened the very integrity of our nation ... 271
269. See ROBINSON, supra note 67, at 236-38.
270. Greg Robinson has persuasively argued that Stimson's boss, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, was quite beset by this racial schema. GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE
PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 242-43 (2001).
271. Hirabayashi Brief, supra note 21, at 61.
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Looking for a way to rationalize the behavior of Edward Ennis
and his colleagues, this Article has roamed far into guesswork.
Perhaps it has roamed further than they deserve. The invasion
component of the Japanese racial schema was surely powerful in
1942, but it did not prove powerful enough to sway the intelligence
analysts of G-2, the military planners in the War Plans Division, or
the top brass of the Army and Navy in their evaluations of the
Japanese threat to the coast. These military officials and units might
have been expected to be at least as susceptible to the invasion
schema as were the lawyers in the Justice Department,272 but they
proved themselves able to avoid it in their internal assessments of the
Japanese threat. This tends to undermine the idea that the factual
assertions in Hirabayashi were an unintended presentation of a racial
schema rather than conscious misrepresentations.
We will never know for sure what led these lawyers to sign a
brief that so vigorously presented facts contradicting what they had
reason to know. Perhaps they knew that real military opinion
contradicted the brief's claims about invasion but felt that they lacked
hard enough data to prove it to their superiors. Perhaps the prevailing
racial schema of the invading Oriental somehow blinded them to the
falsehood of the Hirabayashi brief's dire and alarmist claims about
preparations for an invasion. Or, however inconsistent the invasion
story was with what military leaders had told Congress, perhaps they
saw that they could support that story through judicial notice of
"facts" in the public record, and thereby further the interests of their
client. 3
VI. THE LESSONS OF THE INVASION EVASION
For more than twenty years, we have known that the litigation of
Korematsu v. United States was infected by falsehoods. The
government misrepresented to the Supreme Court the nature and
degree of the internal threat that Japanese Americans posed to the
272. For a discussion of the racial schemas that governed the military's loyalty-
screening programs for Japanese Americans in World War II, see MULLER, supra note
244, at 16-20,42-44.
273. This Article has focused on the civilian attorneys in the Justice Department who
drafted and signed the Hirabayashi brief. It does not address the roles of lawyers outside
the Justice Department, particularly in the military and the War Relocation Authority,
who may have reviewed and commented on drafts of the brief, particularly the section
concerning the threat of invasion. The archival record does not reveal any commentary on
the brief's invasion allegations from those quarters. It stands to reason, however, that
lawyers in the offices of the Army Judge Advocate General and the Assistant Secretary of
War would have been at least as aware of the inaccuracy of the invasion theory as the
Justice Department lawyers were.
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nation's security. Now we also know that the litigation of Hirabayashi
v. United States was infected by comparable falsehoods about the
external threat the nation faced.
To a significant extent, the Court ended up resting its opinion in
Hirabayashi on those falsehoods. As noted earlier, Chief Justice
Stone emphasized the extreme threat to the territory of the
continental United States in evaluating the reasonableness of the
curfew order that Gordon Hirabayashi had defied. 74 As Stone framed
the Court's opinion, it was that extreme territorial threat-the
invasion risk that concurring Justice Douglas insisted was "not
fanciful but real" 275-that disengaged the ordinary equal protection
norm condemning ancestry-based distinctions.
Can we say that these misrepresentations about invasion caused
the Supreme Court to uphold Gordon Hirabayashi's conviction for
violating the curfew? This is closely related to the question so
thoroughly mooted by Professor Jerry Kang in Denying Prejudice: did
the government's deceptions in the Japanese American cases of
World War II, including Hirabayashi, cause legal prejudice to the
litigants, in the sense of operating as a "but-for" cause of the Court's
decision to uphold the wartime measures at issue?276 To varying
degrees, the courts that granted writs of error coram nobis to Gordon
Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu in the 1980s found that the
government's misrepresentations about the internal threat that
274. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
275. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Several decades later, with Hirabayashi and Korematsu under attack, Justice Douglas dug
in his heels and defended the decisions, making even greater claims about the military's
fear of an imminent coastal invasion than the government had actually dared to make in
1943. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 n.20 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"We were advised on oral argument," Douglas recalled,
that if the Japanese landed troops on our west coast nothing could stop them west
of the Rockies. The military judgment was that, to aid in the prospective defense
of the west coast, the enclaves of Americans of Japanese ancestry should be
moved inland, lest the invaders by donning civilian clothes would wreak even
more serious havoc on our western ports. The decisions were extreme and went to
the verge of wartime power; and they have been severely criticized. It is, however,
easy in retrospect to denounce what was done, as there actually was no attempted
Japanese invasion of our country. While our Joint Chiefs of Staff were worrying
about Japanese soldiers landing on the west coast, they actually were landing in
Burma and at Kota Bharu in Malaya. But those making plans for the defense of
the Nation had no such knowledge and were planning for the worst.
Id.
276. See Kang, supra note 17, at 979-97.
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Japanese Americans posed approached that degree of prejudice. 7
While the courts ultimately finessed the precise question of legal
prejudice, both courts clearly labeled the government misconduct as
"critical" '278 and as "profoundly and materially affect[ing]" the
outcome.279
Kang disagrees; in his view, to attribute responsibility for the bad
outcomes in the wartime cases to the misrepresentations of
government lawyers about the supposed internal threat of Japanese
Americans is to collaborate in a historical whitewashing of the
Court's own responsibility for those outcomes.280 He notes, among
other things, that the Court was a highly independent agent in the
Japanese American cases, working hard, and even twisting appellate
procedure, to segment the legal issues those cases presented in order
to allow it to uphold both the curfew and the exclusion of Japanese
Americans, while avoiding constitutional evaluation of their
continued detention.2 18 1 He also makes the crucial point that the
Supreme Court was at least as captive as the military to the racist
schema that cast American citizens of Japanese ancestry as inherently
suspicious and given to subversion.28 The Court, Kang argues, would
therefore likely have upheld the curfew and mass exclusion against
constitutional challenge even if the government had not
misrepresented to it the nature and degree of the internal threat of
sabotage and espionage that Japanese Americans threatened.283
All of this analysis, however, is premised on a narrow set of
falsehoods solely about the internal threat posed by Japanese
Americans. We now know that that the deceptions in these cases
were much broader; they also included a misrepresentation of the
external threat that the West Coast faced and that military officials
were preparing to meet. Would the Justices have upheld the racial
curfew as a reasonable military measure if they had known that the
government's submissions both exaggerated the internal threat and
overstated the external threat?
277. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 601-03 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu
v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1418-19 (N.D. Cal. 1984). A district court vacated
Minoru Yasui's conviction without addressing the question of prejudice. See ERIC K.
YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT 318 (2001).
278. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1418.
279. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 603-04.
280. See Kang, supra note 17, at 985-86.
281. See id. at 943-48, 949-55.
282. See id. at 986.
283. See id. at 985-95.
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It is tempting to speculate that this might have led the Court to
invalidate the curfew. At oral argument in the Korematsu case,
Justice Frankfurter extracted from the Solicitor General a concession
that General DeWitt would have acted illegally if he had issued an
exclusion order against Japanese Americans believing that there was
"no danger from... Japanese operations," but seeing an opportunity
"to take advantage of [his] hostility and clear the Japanese from th[e]
area '"2" despite the absence of danger. Perhaps the disclosures both
that the government had no evidence of subversive activity by
Japanese Americans and that the military was not preparing for a
coastal invasion would have led a majority of the Court to see the
case as approaching Justice Frankfurter's hypothetical. On the other
hand, because the Hirabayashi decision was unanimous, the
disclosure that the military was not preparing for a Japanese invasion
when it ordered the curfew would have had to prompt at least five of
the Justices to invalidate the military's actions. And to reach that
conclusion, those Justices would have had to be free of, or to
surmount, the prevalent racial schema of the "invading Oriental" to
the extent that it existed in their own minds. This seems unlikely.
Thus, the question of whether the invasion distortion amounted to
the sort of legal prejudice necessary to issue a writ of error coram
nobis and set aside a long-final criminal conviction is certainly a close
and difficult one.
But it is crucial to recognize that this question, however
interesting and important, risks distracting us from the important task
of assessing the overall integrity and validity of that wartime decision.
The question that concerned the federal courts in the coram nobis
cases of the 1980s arose in the unique context of efforts to invalidate
individual judgments of criminal conviction many decades after they
had become final. As noted above, those efforts forced the courts to
take a position on whether the wartime Supreme Court had been
duped by government lies into reaching unjust outcomes, or whether
the Court had, in effect, reached them on its own. Today, however,
we face no such choice. Gordon Hirabayashi long ago got his writ. We
are no longer considering anyone's entitlement to relief from a final
criminal judgment. We are considering simply whether Hirabayashi v.
United States is a legitimate decision that deserves any of the respect
that we typically accord to Supreme Court precedent.
284. These words from Frankfurter's question to Fahy are reproduced in Transcript of
Solicitor General's Oral Argument, supra note 115, at 50.
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On this score, it matters little whether the government misled the
Supreme Court into a grossly mistaken analysis or whether the Court
got there on its own. What matters is that the analysis was grossly
mistaken. The Hirabayashi opinion stated a principle of government
power during wartime that was both broad and timeless:
In a case of threatened danger requiring prompt action, it is a
choice between inflicting obviously needless hardship on the
many, or sitting passive and unresisting in the presence of the
threat. We think that constitutional government, in time of war,
is not so powerless and does not compel so hard a choice if
those charged with the responsibility of our national defense
have reasonable ground for believing that the threat is real.285
Where "those charged with the responsibility of our national
defense" find themselves "in time of war and of threatened invasion,"
the Court reasoned, the courts must leave those officials room to
draw the sorts of "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry" that are, in the absence of those dangers, "by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded up
on the doctrine of equality. 2 6 All of these pronouncements, we now
know, rested on falsehood, which makes Hirabayashi as odious as the
racial distinctions of which it approved, not to mention as odious as
the reviled Korematsu case, which approved of comparable racial
distinctions on a foundation of falsehood.
We might draw two additional lessons from the collapse of
Hirabayashi, neither of which is particularly heartening. The first is a
warning about the potentially blinding power of racial schemas in the
wake of attacks by foreign enemies. Edward Ennis proved himself
willing at times to protest internally (though never, it must be noted,
to resign) when he saw certain racial misrepresentations. Yet it
appears that even he may have been seduced by the piece of the
Yellow Peril narrative that cast the Japanese as the twentieth
century's reprise of the Genghis Khan and his Golden Horde. This
sobering possibility invites us to cast a questioning look at the racial-
religious schema that we lay atop the external enemy of our own day,
the "radical Islamist." How are we to distinguish the real harm that
some violent organizations and individuals intend for the United
States from the cataclysmic designs we project onto the caricature of
the "jihadi" and the "Islamofascist" that has haunted the national
consciousness since September 11? Mistaken intelligence information
285. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 95 (1943).
286. Id. at 100.
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about an Arab leader's intent to use weapons of mass destruction has
already struck the nation as plausible enough to launch a war.
Government lawyers defending the indefinite detention of American
citizens as enemy combatants have already depicted them as posing
incalculable danger,287 only to turn around and either submit them to
ordinary civilian criminal trial28 or release them outright into the
hands of a foreign nation.2 89 In the years to come, will Justice
Department lawyers defending antiterrorism measures be able to free
themselves of the schema enough to distinguish the nation's real risks
from its most fantastic fears?
The second lesson of Hirabayashi's demise flows from the first.
We now see that the bankruptcy of Hirabayashi lay in the Court's
willingness to ground a strengthened executive power and a
weakened norm of equal treatment on an erroneous depiction of the
nation's security. That depiction was false, but because of its overlap
with a racial schema, to many people (including, very likely, some of
the Justices of the Supreme Court) it also seemed plausible.
Tragically, this risk of falsehood and mistake is ever present. Officials
of the military and of central intelligence will always know the most
about the external threats that the nation faces. For reasons of
necessity or strategy, they will always try to wrap what they know in a
shell of secrecy. And the courts will always be outside the shell.
Hirabayashi thus illustrates the danger of building rules of
constitutional law on a foundation of supposed facts that are actually
known only to military and intelligence officials. This was Justice
Robert Jackson's famous dissenting position in the Korematsu case.
"In the very nature of things," Jackson wrote, "military decisions are
not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal. 290 He continued:
They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on
information that often would not be admissible and on
assumptions that could not be proved. Information in support
of an order could not be disclosed to courts without danger that
it would reach the enemy. Neither can courts act on
communications made in confidence. Hence, courts can never
have any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of
287. See James Risen & Philip Shenon, U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use
Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at Al.
288. Um, About That Dirty Bomb? N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at A26.
289. Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2.
290. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
1387
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the authority that issued the order that it was reasonably
necessary from a military viewpoint.91
How true these words ring! Perhaps Justice Jackson had already
come to suspect that a year earlier, when he and his eight Brethren
upheld the curfew in Hirabayashi, they had done so on the strength of
a "mere"-and erroneous-declaration of military need. If, as Justice
Jackson maintained, the split decision in Korematsu demonstrated the
risk that courts would make bad constitutional law by trying to review
military orders on unknown "facts," the unanimous decision in
Hirabayashi demonstrated it even more poignantly.
Justice Jackson was an optimist.2 92 As Professor John Q. Barrett
has noted, Jackson was willing to argue that judges should remove
themselves from reviewing the constitutionality of military orders
because he trusted that Americans would elect honest Presidents who
would appoint military officials disinclined to abuse their power293
and that if Americans ended up with officials less wise and restrained
than this, they would replace them.294 But Jackson was also realistic;
he recognized the danger that the Korematsu precedent would pose in
the hands of unscrupulous officials in dangerous times. The Court in
Korematsu mistakenly "validated the principle of racial
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American
citizens. '' 295 And that principle, Jackson said, would "lie[ ] about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. 2 96
Korematsu was not the only loaded weapon that the Court
mistakenly left lying about. Hirabayashi also validated a principle of
racial discrimination in confining American citizens to their homes.
We know now that it was based on a falsehood that appealed to a
visceral racial schema. Time, archival discoveries, and changes in law
have entirely emptied Korematsu of its ammunition. Hirabayashi,
however, still has an old bullet or two in its barrel. It is time to finish
disarming that loaded weapon.
291. Id.
292. John Q. Barrett, A Commander's Power, A Civilian's Reason: Justice Jackson's
Korematsu Dissent, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2005, at 57, 73.
293. See id.
294. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
295. Id.
296. Id.
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